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KLAMATH FARMERS AND CAPPUCCINO
COWBOYS1: THE RHETORIC OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND WHY IT
(STILL) MATTERS
MARCILYNN A. BURKE†
Despite what some of our critics charge, there is no grandiose plot to
roll back safeguards or attempt an across-the-board sunset of existing
regulations. . . .
The changes we are making at OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] are not headline-grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initiatives,
no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of regulatory relief. Yet we are making some changes that we believe will have a longlasting impact on the regulatory state.
2
- John D. Graham (2001)
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ABSTRACT
This Article traces and analyzes the negative, lasting impact of political rhetoric on the Endangered Species Act. The discourse surrounding
the Act is consistent in its themes, assumptions, and images, and it is seductively powerful. Taking the form of stories and slogans or catchphrases, this rhetoric paints a picture of imbalance, pitting humans and
their prosperity against endangered species and their protection. The political rhetoric has spurred a reform movement to solve the problems that
the stories portray. In this way, it influences proposed legislation, regulations, and day-to-day operations of the Executive Branch. Yet, the solutions to these “problems” are ill-advised for several reasons. First, they
seek to address problems that do not exist. The stories are misleading;
important facts and contexts are omitted. Moreover, they seek to create a
new property entitlement for a select segment of the public while at the
same time undermining the values that undergird the Endangered Species Act. And because much of the change occurs within the agency’s
day-to-day routine, it escapes public scrutiny, not being subject to Congressional debate or notice and comment rulemaking procedures. Thus, it
is important to recognize the deflection of the issues, to challenge the
rhetoric, and ultimately to develop alternative, expanded narratives that
reflect the values of the broader public with respect to species protection.

I. INTRODUCTION
Political rhetoric—through the use of stories and catchphrases—
frames debates and influences outcomes. It is directed towards the various
branches of government as well as the public and is presented in various
formats, including Congressional testimony, press releases, newspaper and
magazine articles, and television and radio news broadcasts. Political rhetoric works well with what Zygmunt Plater calls “infotainment,” that is, “the
broadcast news departments’ perceived need to be attractive and engaging
to their desired audience by producing quick and catchy news segments.”3
It is captivating, enduring, and powerful. Significantly, the law responds to
political rhetoric formally through legislation and regulation as well as informally through discretionary acts of the Executive Branch.
As part of the Contract with America, many Republican members of
Congress called for significant reform of the Endangered Species Act

3. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the
Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2002).
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(“ESA” or “the Act”). Recognizing the political sway of well-told, oftrepeated stories, those members of Congress along with private property
rights activists called for reform on behalf of small private property owners
who allegedly were having their rights trampled upon and their financial
lives ruined by overzealous regulators. These “horror stories” illustrating
the Act’s devastating consequences followed a simple, yet intuitively appealing paradigm. In a Lockean world, owners of property have the unfettered right to develop their property as they see fit, perhaps limited only by
the law of nuisance and “background principles” of the state’s property
law.4 If the government, through the Endangered Species Act, wishes to
take one of the sticks out of the fabled property bundle by regulating private activity for the public’s benefit, it must compensate the private property owners for their losses. The meta-story was that the relationship
among species protection, private property rights, and the economy was out
of balance and Congress needed to act to restore the proper balance. With
this world view, the 104th Congress proposed a myriad of legislation to
limit the impact of the ESA on private lands, including proposals to create
a new right of compensation for private landowners whose otherwise lawful activities were prohibited by the Act.
This Article focuses on the nature and persistence of this political
rhetoric over the past decade and its negative impact upon species protection. One might argue that political rhetoric just does not matter because it
does not represent the actual state of affairs. In law- and rule-making, arguably, it would be difficult to hide one’s agenda behind anecdotes and
slogans when the time comes for the careful process of drafting new laws
and regulations.5 After all, no amendments to the ESA resulted from the
Contract with America and its stories.

4. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (“Any limitation so
severe [that is, any regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land] cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”)
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not elaborated on what it means by “background principles” of
state law. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001) (“We have no occasion to consider
the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of property law or whether those circumstances are present here.”). The concept has fostered several law review articles, however. See, e.g., James Burling, The Latest Take on Background Principles and States’
Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 497 (2002); David L. Callies & J.
David Breemer, Selected Legal & Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom, and
Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
339 (2002).
5. Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 637, 640 (1995).
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But this Article submits that rhetoric matters, especially in our discourse about the ESA. It matters for a number of reasons, but mainly because, as Margaret Radin offers, rhetoric “might lead less-than-perfect
practitioners to wrong answers in sensitive cases.”6 And even if the myths
are later dispelled, they leave a lasting imprint on the consciousness of the
American public.
The implementation of the Endangered Species Act raises sensitive
questions and this rhetoric of reform may lead to the wrong answers. Many
of those answers are being developed not through traditional legislative and
regulatory processes, but through policy decisions affected by bureaucrats
that most Americans have never even heard of. That’s right; the real action
is happening behind the scenes—scenes painted by these “tales from the
regulatory crypt.”7 Arguably these stories have affected decisions to list
species as endangered or threatened, decisions to designate critical habitat,
and decisions to defend against challenges to the Endangered Species Act
and its regulations.
Moreover, the rhetoric has steered the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(“the Service”), the ESA’s primary implementing agency,8 toward compromise and to a kind of enforcement scheme that disregards the Service’s
obligations under the Endangered Species Act. Not only has the Service not
countered the perception that these horror stories are true, accurate, and
representative, but it is shaping its policies as if they are in fact true, accurate, and representative.9 The Service is now using “cooperative” and “collaborative” strategies to address the problems portrayed by the horror stories.10 These strategies may be heralded as creative efforts to involve
stakeholders in the development of regulations that will affect them, to
6. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878 (1987).
7. Restoring Accountability to Government Rulemaking and H.R. 3277, ‘The Regulatory Accountability Act’: Before the House Judiciary Comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 104th
Cong. (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith).
8. The Secretary of the Interior, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, has responsibility for
terrestrial and freshwater species and some marine species, while the Secretary of Commerce, through
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has
responsibility for most marine species and most anadromous fish. And the two agencies share jurisdiction over some species. 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627, 15,627-30 (Oct. 6, 1970). For simplification, when the text
refers to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Service, or FWS, it should be read to include NFMS,
unless otherwise indicated.
9. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2004) (codifying the “No Surprises” Rule, which provides assurances to encourage conservation of species).
10. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Our Endangered Species Program and How It Works With
Landowners, at http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/landown.pdf (May 2003) (“By building strong
partnerships and initiating early and collaborative conservation efforts, the Service can best achieve the
purpose of the Endangered Species Act to conserve endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.”).
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draw upon the stakeholders’ expertise, and to save the Act from losing all
force. However, these strategies also raise the concern that these negotiations weaken environmental standards and undermine accountability.
The White House through the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) and the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) also plays an
active role in altering the implementation of the Act. “Our approach is ‘to
maximize the quality of life for America,’ said James L. Connaughton,
chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council on Environmental Quality, ‘and that means balancing the environmental equation with the natural
resources equation, the social equation and the economic equation.’”11 To
achieve this balance, the Bush Administration is insisting upon the use of
cost-benefit analyses and “sound science,” for example. These measures
are directed towards the problems described in the horror stories as well—
problems that may not really exist.
Holly Doremus has written about the successful use of political rhetoric to protect nature and the inability of this rhetoric of the past to continue
to provide protection in a dynamic world. She explains that nature advocates are unhappy now because though they have obtained what they asked
for, they have not in fact asked for what they want.12 Thus, they need to develop a broader discourse to advance nature protection beyond its current
state.13 In contrast, this Article demonstrates that the interests seeking reform of the ESA may no longer be asking directly for they want, but they
are achieving what they want. This Article expands the scope of scholarship in this area to analyze not only the enduring influence of the rhetoric
on formal legal and regulatory processes but also on discretionary acts of
agencies.
Part II of this Article will review the Endangered Species Act generally and more specifically will examine the sections of the Act that the political rhetoric targets. Part III will dissect the rhetoric of the legislative reformers as the background against which the legislative proposals
described in Part IV are analyzed. Part IV will explain the consequences of
the proposals and evaluate how they would affect small landowners, the
central characters of the stories told in Part III. Part V will examine the
counter-rhetoric against the “rollbacks” used by environmental groups and
the Democratic Party. In Part VI, the Article will address the rhetoric of reform as espoused by the Executive Branch and then in Part VII analyze
11. Douglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush Sees a Balance, Critics a Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2003, at 1.
12. Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward A New Discourse, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 14 (2000).
13. Id. at 15-16.

092804 BURKE.DOC

2004]

10/12/2004 4:24 PM

KLAMATH FARMERS AND CAPPUCCINO COWBOYS

447

how that rhetoric is actualized in the Executive Branch’s initiatives. Finally
in Part VIII, the Article will argue that all of this rhetoric and attendant
policies are part of an effort to secure a new entitlement for certain members of the public. By sidestepping the statute, discounting the common
law, and avoiding a discussion of values these reformers are attempting to
create new rights for the select few, at the expense of listed species and the
American public.
Even when legislative or formal regulatory outcomes do not seemingly implement major changes to the Act, the rhetoric that inspired them
and upon which they rely makes lasting changes to the “facts on the
ground.” And it often does so without the scrutiny of Congressional debate
or notice and comment procedures and thus is very dangerous. If the
American public ignores the rhetoric and its long-lasting influence, the
public does so at its own peril. In this way, “rhetoric matters”14 today even
more than it did before.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND TAKINGS
The stated purposes of the Endangered Species Act are to “provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”15 The Act
provides several mechanisms through which the Secretary16 may accomplish these goals. The mechanisms for conservation include land acquisition,17 cooperation with states18 through management agreements19 and cooperative agreements,20 regulation of federal agency actions,21 and the
prohibition of certain acts on private land.22
Though there is much debate surrounding the Endangered Species
Act, this Article focuses only on certain aspects including: (1) Section 4’s
requirements for listing a species and designating critical habitat; (2) Sec-

14. Id. at 12.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
16. References to “the Secretary” mean the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce
except as otherwise provided. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (2000). The 2004 request for land acquisition appropriations total $40.7 million, a decrease of $29.6 million from 2003. H.B. 5092 Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 2003. For land and water acquisitions, $82.25 million is to be derived from the Land
and Water Conservation Fund and is to remain available until it is expended. Id.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2000).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
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tion 9’s prohibition of the taking of endangered species and the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation; and (3) Section 10’s incidental take permits
and habitat conservation plans. In addition, the following discussion of
Sections 6 and 7 of the Endangered Species Act will concentrate on the
subsections that are relevant to the rhetoric and the reforms.
A. Section 4—Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat
Section 4(a) of the Act requires the Secretary to determine whether
any species’ continued existence is “threatened” or “endangered.”23 The
Secretary makes her determination of whether a species should be listed as
threatened or endangered “solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available.”24 Section 4(a) of the Act also requires the Secretary to designate critical habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable,” for every listed threatened or endangered species.25 Critical
habitat is comprised of “the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed . . . [and] on which are found
those physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the
species and which may require special management consideration.”26 Before designating a particular area as critical habitat, the Secretary must first
consider “the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of” such a
designation.27 The D.C. Circuit Court, however, has held that the Service is
not obligated to conduct studies to obtain missing data.28 “[T]he Service
must utilize the best scientific . . . data available, not the best scientific data
possible.”29
B. Section 6—Cooperation with States
Section 6 of the Act provides that the Secretary is to “cooperate to the
maximum extent practicable with the States.”30 Under Section 6’s authority, the Secretary may enter into management agreements “for the admini-

23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2000). An endangered species is “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000). A threatened species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
28. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 215 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
29. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000).
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stration and management of any area established for conservation” of endangered or threatened species.31 Also, if a state proposes a conservation
program and the Secretary determines that it is in accordance with the Act,
the Secretary must enter a cooperative agreement with the state.32 Then the
Secretary is authorized to provide financial assistance of up to 75 percent
of the estimated cost of the program.33
During the Clinton Administration, the Service made increasing use of
this provision. In 1990, appropriations for programs under section 6 were
$6,671,000, approximately 1 percent of the Services’ budget.34 In 1999, the
amount was $23 million, approximately 3 percent of the budget.35 This
trend has continued with the Bush Administration. For FY 2004 the Department requested $121 million, approximately 13 percent of the budget.36
This section provides the statutory basis for the Cooperative Conservation
Initiative, discussed in Section VI.B.3 infra.
C. Section 7—Consultation
Section 7 of the ESA applies only to projects with some federal involvement: a “federal nexus.” This section mandates that the Secretary
work with federal agencies on “any action authorized, funded, or carried
out” that may affect a listed species or its habitat to insure that the action
will not “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species.”37 Also, if any person requiring a permit or license from a
federal agency to carry out her plans “has reason to believe that an endangered species or threatened species may be present in the area affected by
the project and that implementation of such action will likely affect such
species,” the agency also must consult/work with the Service.38
Through the consultation process, the Service lends its expertise to the
action agency, which must conduct a biological assessment of the project
area.39 The Secretary must provide a “biological opinion” concerning how
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(2)(i).
34. Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat. 1915 (1990).
35. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
36. The request included $42,929,000 from the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation
Fund and $86,471,000 from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. H.R. 5093, Department of Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003 (Report in House), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c107:1:./temp/~c107UtzaJa:e16231.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
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the agency’s or applicant’s action will affect the species or its habitat.40 If
“jeopardy or adverse modification is found,” the Secretary must suggest
reasonable and prudent alternatives which she believes may be taken by the
agency or applicant that would not jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species or adversely modify its habitat.41
Arguably a federal nexus is of significant economic and technical
value for an individual landowner when the requirements of section 7 are
compared to those of section 10 of the Act for an “incidental” take.42 Instances in which a private entity may set in motion the section 7 process
“remain the exception rather than the rule,”43 however. Thus, most individual landowners must fulfill the requirements of section 10 themselves if
their planned activities are likely to harm listed species.
D. Section 9—Takings Prohibition
Section 9 of the Act is the main provision governing the activities of
private entities. This section makes it unlawful for any person to “take any
[endangered] . . . species within the United States or the territorial sea of
the United States.”44 The statute defines “take” as “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in
any such conduct.”45 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon pitted Respondents, who described themselves as “small
landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests,” against the Secretary’s regulatory interpretation of the term “harm,” which included habitat modification.46 The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Secretary’s interpretation, finding “that the
Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he defined

40. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
42. See, e.g., David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management
or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 378-79 (1995) (outlining the
differential burdens of sections 7 and 10); Donald L. Soderberg & Paul E. Larsen, Obtaining Incidental
Take Permits Under the Endangered Species Act: The Section 7 Alternative, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 4-6
(1991) (observing that a landowner may be able to receive a permit to take a listed species more quickly
under the section 7 process than the section 10 process and that a landowner is more likely to receive a
permit under section 7).
43. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL L. 605, 620 (1991).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
46. 515 U.S. 687, 692 (1995).
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‘harm’ to include ‘significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.’”47
E. Section 10—Incidental Take Permits and HCPs
Section 10 of the ESA sets forth the procedures under which the Secretary may grant permits to private entities to conduct activities that otherwise would be violations of section 9 because of the incidental taking of a
species.48 A take is incidental if it is prohibited under section 9 but “is incidental to, and not the purpose of carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.”49 To receive a permit, an applicant must develop a habitat conservation plan.50 The plan must specify—
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such
impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such takings the applicant considered
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being neces51
sary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.

The Secretary may issue a permit for an incidental taking if she is satisfied with the information provided in the plan and that “the taking will
not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild.”52 Moreover, the Secretary may revoke the permit if the
permittee does not comply with permit’s terms.53
Individual entities or groups of entities may develop habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”).54 Plans that involve significant governmental participation are often known as regional habitat conservation plans (“RHCPs”)
and attempt to provide for large areas of land which involve many different
interests. From the small landowner’s perspective, the requirements of an
HCP can eviscerate any intentions to exploit the property economically.

47. Id. at 708.
48. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2001) for detailed provisions.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
51. Id.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(C).
54. See J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered
Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. L. 345 (1999) (explaining the
fundamentals of HCPs). As of October 1, 2001, over 447 HCPs had been approved, addressing more
than 516 species across more than 39 million acres. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation
Plans Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act, at 1, at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCP_
Incidental_Take.pdf (2002).
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Costs associated with the development of an HCP may include mitigation
fees as well as paying for biological surveys and legal counsel. Although
the Service has not compiled any data concerning the costs of developing
an HCP,55 several sources indicate that these costs exceed the resources of
the typical small landowner.56 One study of the RHCP for Austin, Texas
estimated that in the absence of an RHCP, the cost of compliance with the
ESA for landowners would be approximately $9,000 per acre in 1992 dollars.57 The assessment under the RHCP was estimated to be between $600
and $3,000 per acre.58
The ability of landowners to join together and proportionally share the
costs of development can mitigate the effect of the requirement, yet several
factors may make this sharing arrangement a non-viable option. Divergent
interests, resources, and sizes of landholdings as well as the political climate concerning conservation efforts in the area are a few of the obstacles
to building consensus among several landowners.59 For example, the HCP
developed to address the Stephens’ kangaroo rat in California affects approximately 80,000 acres of land and thousands of landowners.60 While it
may be desirable to include a great number of participants to instill confidence in the process and encourage cooperation in implementation, the

55. The Endangered Species Act: The Role of Habitat Conservation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
103d Cong. 41 (1993) [hereinafter The Role of Habitat Conservation Hearing] (testimony of Michael
Spears, then Assistant Director for Ecological Services, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
56. See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 382 (1994) (stating “cost may be prohibitive for small landowners not
covered by regional or project HCPs funded by big developers or state and local governments”).
57. Melinda E. Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin, Texas’
Risky Approach to Ensuring Endangered Species’ Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L.
581, 587 n.33 (1994) (citing GEORGE W. GAU & JAMES E. JARRETT, ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY OF
BALCONES CANYONLANDS CONSERVATION PLAN 4-15 (1992)).
58. Id. The costs are less per acre because of economies of scale. Rather than requiring developers
to acquire a permit for each individual activity, the Service authorizes development in the entire area
with one regional permit. Id. In 1994 fees ranged from $250 per acre in Clark County Nevada for the
desert tortoise HCP to $1,950 in Riverside County California for the HCP for the Stephens’ kangaroo
rat. The San Bruno Mountain HCP collects an annual fee of $20 per unit for residential property and
$10 per one thousand square feet for commercial property. TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND URBAN GROWTH 38-39 (1994).
59. See BEATLEY, supra note 59, at 40-53 (describing the different stakeholders in the HCP process and their perspectives with respect to their level of environmental concern, the value they place on
endangered species, their perceived legitimacy of land regulation, their expectations for land holdings,
and their interest in quick resolution).
60. The Endangered Species Act-Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 13 (1993) [hereinafter Incentives to Encourage Conservation
by Private Landowners] (statement of Robert D. Thornton).
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numbers themselves bode against any one small landowner or even a group
of small landowners having significant input in the final plan.61 Furthermore, the lengthy average time that elapses between submission of a plan
and a response from the Secretary is a factor which may be a costly burden
for a small landowner.62 Another difficulty for the small landowner engaged in the HCP process as contrasted to the large landowner is that the
small landowner often cannot shift her development activities to avoid the
species’ habitat.63
The use of the HCP expanded greatly during the tenure of Secretary
Bruce Babbitt.64 It could be said that Babbitt perceived the rhetoric of reform as a omen and knew that if the agency did not take some action to
quell the cries of the private property rights advocates, one of the compensation bills presented in the 104th-106th Congresses may have passed.65 So
he tried to balance the interests of the species and the landowners. One
such initiative, the “no surprises” policy, is analyzed in detail infra Part
VII.B.2.b. However, Babbitt was not without his critics arguing that HCPs
were of limited effectiveness.66

61. MICHAEL J. BEAN, ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 13 (1991) (stating that “[t]wo obvious problems
emerge . . . . One is to ensure that all those with an interest in the HCP process have an opportunity to
participate in it and the other is to keep the process from involving so many parties as to be unmanageable.”).
62. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 62, at 648 (explaining that “[e]ven a relatively simple singlespecies conservation plan can be expected to require more than a year of processing taking into account
NEPA’s requirements, the § 10(a) permit process, and local government processing requirements.”).
63. “The traditional approach of the HCPs of drawing a line on the map and identifying preservation zones and development zones works OK if you have very large landowners who are able to move
their resource development activities around. It does not work where you have thousands of private
landowners . . . .” Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 62, at 60
(statement of Robert D. Thornton, attorney having represented landowners, developers, and local and
regional agencies in the area of endangered species). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 320 (1997) (citing
evidence that large landowners may be able to shift burdens onto smaller, less organized landowners).
64. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary
View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 213-14 (2001) (explaining that, during Babbitt’s tenure, “hundreds of millions
of acres of public and private land . . . came directly under the ESA’s influence . . .”); J.B. Ruhl, Who
Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 367, 382-83 (1998) (stating that, during the 1990s “hundreds of HCPs [were] approved,
many of which encompass large planning areas that include valuable ecosystem features.”)
65. See Leshy, supra note 64, at 209 (“With the Republican takeover of Congress, the Administration’s natural resource legislative agenda conflated into two relatively narrow goals. The first was to
play effective defense and damage control, fighting off unacceptable legislation in a host of areas . . . .”).
66. See e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 71-74 (2001);
Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships, 16
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III. THE RHETORIC OF LEGISLATIVE “REFORM”
In the lengthy process of reauthorization, members of Congress, administrations, environmentalists, business people, landowners, and others
have proposed a number of reforms for the Endangered Species Act. Most
environmental interest groups have focused their efforts upon improving
the process for developing habitat conservation plans, including increased
technical assistance to landowners.67 The focus of Congress was altogether
different when the Republican Party took control in 1994. Before the 1994
Congressional elections, most of the proposed amendments dealt substantively with the provisions of the Act.68 During the first 100 days of the
104th Congress and its Contract with America, however, Congress focused
on providing compensation to private property owners if they suffered a
specified percentage of diminution in the value of their land due to regulation under the Act.69 Moreover, that Congress passed a moratorium, to endure until reauthorization, on the listing of endangered or threatened species and the designation of critical habitat.70 That moratorium has been
lifted,71 but the Republicans’ focus on radical change persists into the new
millennium.72
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 94, 95, 96 (2001); Jennifer Jester, Comment, Habitat Conservation Plans
Under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse and the Unfulfilled Mandate of Species Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 147-58 (1998).
67. See generally Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 60, at
78; see also Endangered Species: Push on for Reform of Act During Reauthorization, MGMT.
BRIEFING, Jan. 9, 1995 (National Wildlife Federation suggesting encouraging regional habitat conservation plans and setting up a “small landowner grant program” to help landowners prepare HCPs); Endangered Species Act Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. On Clean Water, Fisheries and Wildlife of
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 162-65 (1994), (statement of Ted R.
Brown, President, Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress advocating that “[t]he HCP
process must be refocused”).
68. See, e.g., H.R. 1490, 103d Cong., § 402 (1993); S. 1521, 103d Cong., § 402 (1993). Both of
these bills contained basically the same amendments which addressed, inter alia, expanding the availability of consultation under section 7 of the Act, establishing an administrative appeals process, and
providing financial incentives to private entities for habitat conservation such as “habitat reserve grants”
69. See, e.g., H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 191, 104th Cong.,
(1994).
70. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to
Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, ch. 4, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995)
(rescinding funds from Interior for listing species and designating critical habitat).
71. The omnibus appropriations act of 1996 gave the President the authority to suspend the moratorium, Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-34, 110 Stat.
1321-159 to -160 (1996), and former President Bill Clinton suspended the moratorium upon signing the
bill into law on April 26, 1996. Robert Dodge, Clinton Signs Budget Measure, Calls Bill Something We
Can All Be Proud Of, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 27, 1996, at 3A.
72. For example, one recent legislative proposal would have lifted the prohibition against the taking of a listed species if the act or omission causing the take occurred on private land. Life, Liberty, and
Property Protection Act, H.R. 5809, 107th Cong., § 3 (2002).
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The 104th Congress emphasized in its rhetoric the plight of small
landowners. Tales were spun of “powerful regulators running roughshod
over landowners whose entire financial and emotional lives are closely tied
to their land.”73 But the rhetorical effect achieved by those stories goes beyond the harms to those individual landowners. The question arises of not
only whether the stories are true with respect to those individuals but also
whether those stories are representative of this regulatory regime. One story
may not be the common story. Moreover, small landowners and large landowners may have different and often conflicting priorities. For example, a
letter to a House Committee by a self-proclaimed “private non-industrial
(‘small landowner’) in Washington” stated that while the members of the
Washington Farm Forestry Association “share many of the concerns of the
industrial landowners, from whom you received testimony[,] . . . we have
smaller holdings and different management objectives, and in Washington
State we also own almost half the privately held forest land.”74 Apparently
recognizing these differences, Congressman Bill Thomas once explained,
“Small property owners have become endangered species under the ESA’s
draconian regulation. Unfortunately, they are rarely noticed.”75 Yet even
though the small landowners have occupied Congressional soundbites, as
these stories are presented in this article query who is really being harmed
and who would be benefited by the proposed reforms.
The stories told by legislative and executive branches of government
differ slightly and both are worthy of study. In so doing, one should not
limit her evaluation of this rhetoric to what stories are being told and the
truthfulness and representativeness thereof. Instead, one should also consider what parts of those stories are not being told and, moreover, which
stories are being omitted completely.
Equally important in a critical perspective is to notice what is not included in the ongoing streams of words and images, the stories not told,
the images not displayed. As Burke insists, every supposed reflection of
some facet of experience is in reality a selection, or a choice from among
options selected to represent the idea or issue under focus. Such selections are inevitably deflections; they hide and obscure what lies outside
the selection. Over time, one forgets (if indeed one ever realized) that the
selection does not reflect the whole, only a chosen aspect or part of that
whole. It is then accepted un-problematically as a valid reflection. As

73. Doremus, supra note 12, at 43.
74. Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 60, at 153.
75. Congressman Bill Thomas, What is the Most Compelling Environmental Issue Facing the
World on the Brink of the Twenty-First Century: Externalization of Federal Public Policy Costs: The
Endangered Species Act, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 171, 177 (1996).
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Burke notes, this process is an inevitable aspect of symbol use, although
76
it certainly at times may be a conscious strategy.

It is not uncommon for those attempting to persuade to use anecdotes
or colorful stories to make a compelling argument, and this Article’s concern about rhetoric may seem misplaced. As Michael Wolf argues about
the significance of this rhetorical posturing in the legislature, perhaps,
as important debates such as this one advance beyond the fifteen-second
soundbite stage, the rhetorical posturing that accompanies bill sponsorship often dissolves when votes are officially tallied. Moreover, as the
difficult task of drafting the language required to reach a majority or, in
the face of a veto, a supermajority, begins, it becomes increasingly diffi77
cult to hide controversial agendas.

Wolf may be correct that the rhetoric can only affect legislative outcomes
to a small degree, but the stories that began as a part of the Contract with
America have persisted from Congress to Congress. Indeed some of the
stories, though largely myths, are a part of the American cultural fabric and
appear to undergird many policy decisions time and time again.
For example, the family farmer is often held up as the poster child for
legislative reform.78 The plight of family farmers was used artfully as a justification for amending the estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, otherwise known as the “death tax.”79 As one Wall Street Journal article explained,

76. Mark Mesiter & Phyllis M. Japp, Introduction: A Rationale for Studying Environmental
Rhetoric and Popular Culture, in ENVIROPOP 7 (Mark Meister & Phyllis M. Japp. eds., 2002) (citing
KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (3d ed. 1969) and KENNETH BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD
HISTORY (2d ed. 1984)) (citation omitted).
77. Wolf, supra note 5.
78. See e.g., Harvesting Poverty: The Farmland Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, at A42 (“The
family farm. Few institutions are more central—iconic, even—to America’s self-image. The words
themselves conjure up Norman Rockwell and a shared national heritage that extols self-reliance and the
conquest of the frontier. Politics tends to exploit easily romanticized icons, and the family farm has not
been spared.”)
79. David Cay Johnson, IRS Data Dispute Danger to Farms, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2001, at C17
(“‘To keep farms in the family, we are going to get rid of the death tax,’” President Bush vowed a
month ago. He and many others have made the point repeatedly.”); Gov’t Press Release, Fed. Document Clearing House, Conrad Burns, Senate Will Move to Repeal “Death” Tax, Burns Hopes 99-1 Vote
Shows Serious Commitment to Family Businesses, Farms (July 11, 2000), 2000 WL 7980084 (“‘The
death tax destroys Montana’s small businesses and family farms, costing us jobs we cannot afford to
lose,’ Burns said. ‘In order to pay off the death tax, many families have to sell their businesses and
farms. Folks have their incomes taxed throughout their lives only to have their estates taxed on the same
income again after they die, which often leaves their families in the lurch.’”); Richard W. Stevenson,
House Approves A Bill to Repeal the Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at A1 (“The [Republican
House] leaders said they were driven in part by a desire to help owners of small businesses and family
farms, who have long complained that the estate tax makes it costly or even impossible to pass their
holdings along to another generation.”).
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Invariably, proponents invoke sob stories of struggling Midwesterners
forced to sell family farms to avoid onerous estate taxes. But last month
the New York Times reported that nobody can find a bona fide example
of a farm lost because of estate taxes. Neil Harl, an Iowa state economist
and foremost specialist in this area, said he’d searched “far and wide”
and found the demise of family farms because of the estate tax “a
80
myth.”

And despite the many news reports that the proposed legislation
would not have aided the mythical family farms in those stories,81 the bill
ultimately passed, reducing the rates immediately and setting up a complete
repeal of the tax in 2010.82 Despite the fact that family farms were not experiencing these problems with estate taxes, the rhetoric led the way to the
legislative “solution.”
Indeed, in political discourse, the goal may be to exalt rhetoric over
facts. In the case of environmental regulation, repeatedly these mythical
farmers, ranchers, and miners have been woven into simple, yet appealing
tales to justify a lack of regulation83 or deregulation.84 As a memorandum
prepared by the Luntz Research Companies for the Republican Party and
the Bush Administration entitled “Straight Talk” explained, “Indeed, it can
be helpful to think of environmental (and other) issues in terms of ‘story.’
A compelling story, even if factually inaccurate, can be more emotionally
compelling than a dry recitation of the truth.”85 The memo then explains
the problem with relying too heavily upon facts:

80. Albert R. Hunt, The Trojan Horse Tax Cut, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001, at A19.
81. See, e.g., George Soros, Kill the Death Tax Now . . . No, Keep it Alive to Help the Needy,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2000, at A14 (“Supporters of repealing the estate tax say the legislation would
save family farms and businesses and lift a terrible and unfair burden. I happen to be fortunate enough
to be eligible for the tax benefits of this legislation, and so I wish I could convince myself to believe the
proponents’ rhetoric. Unfortunately, it just isn’t so.”); Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 62 (“Tales of family farms and businesses broken up to pay the estate tax are
basically rural legends; hardly any real examples have been found, despite diligent searching.”).
82. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38, 69-86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
83. Another example is use of family farms to excuse moving slowly in the regulation of nonpoint source pollution under the Clean Water Act. Government: Farmers Fear the EPA Future, 6
WATER TECH. NEWS, Nov. 19, 1998 (quoting the President of the American Farm Bureau Federation,
who explained that “[o]f all the ways government regulations impact the lives of family farmers, arbitrary water quality regulations will likely turn out to be the most harmful.”).
84. See discussion infra Part IV, noting that while cost-benefit analysis and sound science, for
example, are required to justify new regulations under the Bush Administration, anecdotes and myths
appear to be sufficient to justify deregulation.
85. Memorandum from the Luntz Research Companies, Straight Talk 132 (2002), at
http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/LuntzResearch.Memo.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Luntz
Memo].
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The facts were beside the point. Facts only become relevant when the
public is receptive and willing to listen to them. . . .
How do we avoid such debacles in the future?
[I]t’s all in how you frame your argument, and the order in which you
present your facts. Don’t allow yourself to become bogged down in minutiae when you should be presenting the big picture. You should have
the details at hand to back you up, to be sure, but don’t be afraid to begin
86
by painting in broad strokes.

Sometimes rhetoric may bring to light the importance of actual issues
or elicit the emotional response required to spur needed legislative reform.
Yet these “broad strokes” also can become problematic in policymaking for
they can lead to misconceptions and bad decisions. As the economists
Power and Barrett argue, misunderstandings tend “to distort public decision
making.”87 Decisions are “grossly and irrationally misinformed” and the
public sacrifices public goods such as clean air and water and critical habitat to address an imagined or fabricated crisis.88 Below are a few examples
of stories that may lead to unnecessary and ill-advised sacrifices.
A. Sample Tales from the Regulatory Crypt
Before this analysis proceeds any further, it is important to examine
some of the “stories”. Sketched out below are some of those stories that reformists in Congress and private property rights activists have been telling.
The stories, told for roughly the last decade, will likely elicit a strong reaction that something is terribly wrong with the implementation of the ESA if
it results in these kinds of “train wrecks.” As one reads these stories, consider what facts the storyteller has selected and not selected.
1. John Crawford of Klamath Basin, Tulelake, California
John Crawford lives in a river basin in California. Almost 100 years
ago, Mr. Crawford’s great grandfather, a World War I veteran, settled in
the area after the federal government lured him and other veterans there
with the promise of water from a dam to be used for irrigation of crops.89 In
the spring of 2001, however, Crawford, a fourth generation tender of the
land, was forced to stop planting new crops and watch his existing crops

86. Id. at 133.
87. THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N. BARRETT, POST-COWBOY ECONOMICS: PAY AND
PROSPERITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN WEST 126 (2001).
88. Id.
89. Klamath River Sparks Irrigation War, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, at http://www.enn.com/news/
wire-stories/2001/07/07132001/ap_klamath_44232.asp?site=email (July 13, 2001).

092804 BURKE.DOC

2004]

10/12/2004 4:24 PM

KLAMATH FARMERS AND CAPPUCCINO COWBOYS

459

turn brown.90 That was because the federal government had decided not to
release the water from the dam for irrigation in order to keep it in the river
for the benefit of an endangered species of fish.91 It was estimated that Mr.
Crawford and his neighbors would lose at least $300 to $500 million that
year.92 If the dam remained closed beyond that year, Crawford and his
neighbors in effect would be evicted forcibly from the land that their families had farmed for generations because the government had taken away
their right to water.
2. Margaret Rector of Austin, Texas
Approximately thirty years ago, Margaret Rector purchased fifteen
acres of land in Austin, Texas and considered it a kind of annuity.93 She
planned to wait for the land to appreciate in value and then to sell it to provide for her retirement. In 1990, at the age of seventy, Ms. Rector was told
by the Fish and Wildlife Service that her land was the home of a protected
species of bird, the golden-cheeked warbler. She may be able to develop
her land, but it will cost her tens of thousands of dollars for ecological studies and lawyers. Meanwhile, the market value of the land has fallen from
$830,000 to $30,000 because of the resulting restrictions on land use.94
3. Sam Pullig of Belle Chasse, Louisiana
Sam Pullig owns 1,000 acres of land in Louisiana. Mr. Pullig has been
trying for two years to get permission from the Fish & Wildlife Service to
harvest $200,000 worth of timber.95 He needs a permit because six redcockaded woodpeckers, members of an endangered species, are nesting on
his land. As Mr. Pullig explained at a congressional field hearing, “with
added finance and other expenses, ‘these birds, weighing about 7 ounces
each, are costing me about $6,000 per ounce.’”96 He further stated, “‘I’m
tired and angry that I’m being treated so unfairly.’”97

90. Id.; Growing with Less Water, HERALD & NEWS, at http://www.heraldandnews.com/articles/
2003/07/31/news/agriculture/awater.txt (July 31, 2003).
91. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Water Allocation Decision Announced for Klamath
Project (Apr. 6, 2001), http://www.doi.gov/news/010409.html.
92. John D. Cramer, Thousands turn out to protest Klamath irrigation shutdown, THE BULLETIN
(Bend, Or.), May 14, 2001, http://www.bendbulletin.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=4014.
93. James V. DeLong, Editorial, It’s My Land, Isn’t It?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A25.
94. Id.
95. Bob Anderson, Task Force Hears Louisianans’ Environmental Law Problems, THE ADVOC.
(Baton Rouge, La.), Mar. 14, 1995, at 1A.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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B. And Now The Buried Parts of the Tales
Not surprisingly, some of the less sympathetic details of these stories
were omitted or deselected, as have some of the most basic elements of the
stories.
1. John Crawford Had Some Immediate Relief Available
Though the Bureau of Reclamation’s initial determination was to restrict severely the use of water by farmers in the Klamath Basin,98 John
Crawford was not as high and dry as one might have thought. First, the
federal government provided $75 million in relief for those affected by the
water restrictions.99 Secondly, some farms did receive their allotment of
water.100 And federal crop insurance of over $135 million101 and the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program were available to the farmers.102
Thus, this story is certainly not one of lack of compensation. Perhaps the
question that really needs to be asked is whether the compensation offered
was just. You will not find such a distinction, however, in Mr. Crawford’s
version of the story nor will you find any details of how he calculated the
farmers’ expected losses.

98. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra note 91.
99. Twenty-five million dollars in relief is provided by Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 132, 117 Stat. 1827, 1840-41 (2003). Of that amount $2.6
million was provided for reimbursement for expenses incurred by those who did not receive their water
allotment and the remainder was designated to improve “efficiency and use” of the existing water supply. H.R. REP. NO. 108-212, at 102 (2003). Also, the Erodable Land and Wetland Conservation and
Reserve Program specifically provides $50 million for water conservation through cost-share payments,
incentive payments, and loans to carry out water conservation projects in Klamath Basin to enhance the
quality and increase the quantity of water available to farmers and ranchers. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-(9)(c)
(2000).
100. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Interior Secretary to Order Water Release to
Klamath Farmers, at http://www.doi.gov/news/010724a.html (July 24, 2001) (announcing that seventy
to seventy-five thousand acre-feet of water would be released from Upper Klamath Lake to assist farmers in need).
101. In California, farmers in the following counties received insurance payments and in the following amounts: Humboldt – $509,993; Tehama – $16,642,145; Siskiyou – $3,984,788; Shasta –
$1,535,505; Modoc – $2,524,487; Glen – $41,491,332; and Butte – $56,019,285 for a total of
$122,707,535. Data was not available for Trinity and Del Norte counties. In Oregon, farmers in the following counties received insurance payments and in the following amounts: Klamath – $2,288,777;
Lake – $2,298,275; and Jackson – $7,756,564 for a total of $12,343,616. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, at http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/stateCountyCrop.cfm (last modified April 19, 2004).
102. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra note 91.
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2. Margaret Rector Turned Down an Offer for $525,000
The government was willing to pay Ms. Rector $82,500, less than
10% of the tax assessed value in 1989,103 but still the government had offered something. Also, in 1994 Ms. Rector had a purchase offer of
$525,000, but wanted $600,000 and thus turned it down.104 Lastly, Ms.
Rector’s land was part of a regional habitat conservation plan and she
would have been assessed a mitigation fee of between $600 and $3,000 per
acre or $9,000 up to $45,000 total.105 The Service uses mitigation fees to
purchase land in the same habitat.106 And “[e]ven Miss Rector doesn’t entirely blame the warbler for her troubles. ‘I have to say that part of [the decrease] was the economy.’”107 One prospective buyer of Ms. Rector’s land
said that he had purchased nearby land for one-fifth of its 1985 value and
explained that the drop in price had nothing to do with the Endangered
Species Act because it never applied to the property that he purchased.108
Thus, not taking into account any other market forces that may have affected the value of her land (such as the savings and loan crisis and the faltering real estate market in Texas),109 and assuming that she would have
been unable to recoup the fee when she ultimately sold the property, at
most the value of Ms. Rector’s land had been diminished by five percent as
a result of the enforcement of the Act.
3. Sam Pullig’s Birds Were on the Original Endangered Species List
Sam Pullig told his story at a congressional “field hearing” in Belle
Chasse, Louisiana in March 1995.110 Yet this account neglected one key detail: Mr. Pullig knew the birds were nesting on the land before he bought it

103. John Anderson, This Land is My Land, SMARTMONEY, Sept. 1, 1996, at 106, available at
1996 WL 16053079.
104. George Rodrique, Act’s Effect on Land Disputed: Habitat Preservation is Blamed for Drop in
Value, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996, available at 1996 WL 2109750.
105. Melinda E. Taylor, supra note 57. One potential buyer of Ms. Rector’s land said that the Service told him that upon payment of a $44,000 mitigation fee, he could develop the land. Rodrique, supra note 104. He believes that the fee is 6% of the land’s ultimate value. Id.
106. Anderson, supra note 103.
107. Rodrique, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. In 1987, “[l]osses at Texas S&Ls comprise more than one-half of all S&L losses nationwide,
and of the 20 largest losses, 14 are in Texas. Texas economy in major recession: crude oil prices fall by
nearly 50%, office vacancy is over 30%, and real estate prices collapse.” FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A
Chrono-Bibliography, at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2002). See
also Rodrique, supra note 104 (noting the collapse of the savings and loan industry and the drop in real
estate prices in Austin).
110. Heather Dewar, Lawmakers Hear Cajuns’ Gripes Over Wildlife Laws, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
17, 1995, at A13.

092804 BURKE.DOC

462

10/12/2004 4:24 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 14:2

for logging in 1993.111 He had planned “to leave a 200-foot circle of uncut
trees around each nest but was dismayed to learn that his plan would not
satisfy federal wildlife managers.”112 Lest any sympathy remain for this
landowner, the red-cockaded woodpecker was listed as an endangered species on June 2, 1970113 and was designated as a “national species of special
emphasis” in 1983.114 Such species “are considered to be of high biological,
legal, and public interest and merit special effort and attention by the Service at the national level.”115 The only surprised party in this instance
would have been the Service if this landowner had filed a takings claim.
IV. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
Having sampled some of the stories, this Article now turns to some of
the proposed reforms. Among them were requirements for “takings impact
analysis,” sound science, cost-benefit analysis, and consultation under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The legislative proposals for direct
compensation for which the horror stories were the prelude would have serious implications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.
Simply put, the bills would have compensated landowners for losses that
were less than complete, turning Supreme Court precedent on its head. In
addition, this Part of the Article addresses the potential for abuse by large
landholders and evaluates the choice of remedies offered. It also evaluates
them according to how well they address the purported concern for small
landowners. This Part also considers the use of appropriations riders to try
to accomplish what could not be done through the headline grabbers such
as the Private Property Rights Act of 1995.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 35 Fed. Reg. 8495 (1970); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2004) (endangered species list). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a takings claim is not barred by the fact that title to property was acquired
after the effective date of a regulation. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-631 (2001). However, the concurring opinion states that with respect to the reasonable investment-backed expectations
factor of Penn Central takings analysis, the temporal relationship between the enactment of the regulation and the acquisition of title does help to shape the reasonableness of those expectations and to determine whether a compensable taking has occurred. Id. at 632-36.
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 55,049 (1983).
115. Id.
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A. The Darling of the “Reform” Movement: Direct Compensation Statutes
Beginning with the Contract with America in the 104th Congress116
and in almost every Congress thereafter, conservatives have introduced
measures to provide private landowners compensation whenever enforcement of the ESA results in any diminution in the value of private land.
These bills basically mimic each other but for the percentage (or dollar
amount) of diminution in the value of property needed to trigger compensation.117 For this discussion, the Article focuses on the Endangered Species
Land Management Reform Act introduced in the 107th Congress.118
The proposed Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act
provided that—
No agency may take an action under this Act affecting privately owned
property that results in the diminishment of the value of any portion of
that property by an amount equal to or greater than 50 percent of the
value of that portion unless compensation is offered in accordance with
119
this section.

Compensation for the diminishment would have taken one of two forms:
(1) payment for the diminution in value or (2) at the option of the owner,
the agency would have been required to buy the affected portion of the
property by paying the “fair market value” of that portion based on the
value before the diminution and without regard to the presence of or use by
a listed species.120 In order to obtain compensation, the private property
owner would have to submit a written request.121 The Endangered Species
Land Management Reform Act further provided that if the agency and the
property owner were not able to agree upon the amount of compensation

116. See e.g., S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995) (landowner entitled to compensation when “deprived of
$10,000, or 20 percent or more of the fair market value of the affected portion of the property”); H.R.
790, 104th Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of 50 percent or more of the fair
market value, or the economically viable use of the affected portion of the property”).
117. See, e.g., H.R. 472, 107th Cong. (2001) (entitled to compensation or to be bought out for
diminution of value of 25% or more); H.R. 1142, 106th Cong. (1999); (entitled to compensation for the
fair market value of the federal use of the property or portion thereof); H.R. 495, 106th Cong. (1999)
(entitled to compensation for diminution of value of 50% or more); S. 781, 105th Cong. (1997) (entitled
to compensation if there is a temporary or permanent diminution in property value greater than 33%);
H.R. 4335, 105th Cong. (1998) (entitled to compensation when value of any portion of land is reduced
by 50% or more); S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of $10,000, or
20 percent or more of the fair market value of the affected portion of the property”); H.R. 790, 104th
Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of 50 percent or more of the fair market value,
or the economically viable use of the affected portion of the property”).
118. H.R. 1403, 107th Cong. (2001). Thus far, no such bill has been introduced in the 108th Congress.
119. Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act, H.R. 1403, 107th Cong., § 2(a) (2001).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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within 180 days of the property owner’s written request for compensation,
“the owner of the property may elect binding arbitration through alternative
dispute resolution or seek compensation due under this section in a civil action.”122 The parties could agree to extend the 180-day period without affecting the ability of the landowner to choose arbitration or court action.123
The arbitral proceedings were to be conducted in accordance with procedures established by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).124
Borrowing from the language of the Fifth Amendment, the proposed
legislation also provided that a landowner who prevailed in a civil action
would be entitled to “just compensation,” as well as “attorney’s fees and
other litigation costs, including appraisal fees.”125 Moreover, the bill provided for the establishment of the Species Conservation Fund to carry out
projects on private land to conserve listed species. No further appropriations would have been made available for this purpose, however.126 If
money were not available in the fund, the agency would have to pay the
award out of the following year’s appropriations.127
The Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act and other
similar proposals for compensation128 are interesting for a number of reasons. First, they appear to be an attempt to overrule the Supreme Court’s
determination of the relevant parcel of land for consideration of lost value
in takings cases under the Fifth Amendment.129 Second, landowners may
abuse the scheme by skewing their development plans to heap the majority
of the project onto the regulated portion of their property and then use the
amendments’ explicit rights of compensation to fund the development of
the rest of the property. Interestingly, the larger the landowner’s holdings,
the better able he would be to profit from the legislation, even if he had no
reasonable investment-backed expectations. These proposals also have
been criticized as nothing more than an entitlement for large landowners

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 3(a).
127. Id. § 2(a).
128. For the purposes of this discussion, the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 2000, H.R.
472, 107th Cong. is essentially the same proposal, though differing in three significant respects. It sets
the threshold level of diminution in value at 25% and it does not establish a special fund for compensation. It also attempts to “clarify” the definition of “take” as now defined in the regulations, 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3 (2001), that was the source of controversy in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon v. Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
129. See e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that Court
must consider the parcel as a whole).
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and lawyers.130 And finally, they provided for arbitration of claims because
arbitration was argued to be a more viable option than litigation for small
landowners. The following discussion will examine these criticisms as well
as analyze the bill’s impact on small landowners.
1. Implications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence
In Penn Central Transportation v. New York City,131 the U.S. Supreme
Court, although unable to establish a “set formula,” identified several factors to be weighed in determining whether a regulation has effected a taking.132 These factors included (1) the character of the regulation, (2) the
economic impact of the regulation upon the private property owner, and
(3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the distinct investment-backed expectations of the property owner.133 The Court used these
factors as a balancing test to resolve conflicts between the interests of the
affected private property owner and the interests of the general public. The
Court has consistently held that regulations cannot force “‘some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.’”134 Yet, the Court has also recognized that
in fulfilling its function as a protector of the public good, “[g]overnment
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”135
The Court thus saw a need to balance these interests and consequently has
engaged in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”136 to strike a balance between these competing interests. The Court, however, has “found categorical treatment appropriate where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”137 The Court acknowledged, however, that
this rule does not “make clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss
of value is to be measured.”138 Thus, it appears that the Court will continue
making ad hoc factual inquiries.
The proposed legislation attempts to provide “categorical treatment”
as an answer to the Court’s open question.139 It seems on its face that rather

130. E.g., 141 CONG. REC. E823-25, E823 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller) (arguing that large
companies would receive most of the compensation).
131. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
132. Id. at 124.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
135. Id. at 124 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
136. Id.
137. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
138. Id. at 1016 n.7.
139. “In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case . . . .” Id. at 1016.
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than investigating the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the
reasonable investment-backed expectations of a particular landowner, the
bill would grant blanket relief regardless of the characteristics of the specific property or the legitimate expectations of the landowner (for example,
at the time of acquisition did the owner know of the existence of the endangered species and the likely limitations on the development of the parcel). Yet, the Court’s fact-based approach arguably is the only sensible one
because it recognizes the potential conflict between the interests of the individual property owner and the public.
Takings determinations are a judicial matter. The judicial compromise . . . entails an inquiry—often detailed and fact-laden—into which
rights are “vested” or legitimately expected and which are not, and how
much damage is an unacceptable burden on an existing owner. Such inquiries are necessarily case-by-case, messy though it seems. . . .
[E]xpectations vary enormously, and include questions of timing and
140
conditions of purchase, and other quite individualized questions.

And the Court has reaffirmed the Penn Central analysis recently in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.141 Justice O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion that Penn Central remains the “polestar” in cases of partial takings.142
Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is
one of a number of factors that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.
....
. . . The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination
143
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.

The tribunals would have to determine at what point in time the relevant
investment-backed expectations formed. Should value be judged against
the expectations at the time of acquisition, at the time of discovery of a
listed species on the property, at the time the landowner devises a development plan that concentrates her activity in the habitat of the listed species, or at some other point in time which the tribunal believes accurately
reflects the loss suffered by the landowner?
What may be the most significant part of the legislation is that it
would change the relevant parcel for determination of diminution of value,

140. Private Property Rights, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995) [hereinafter Private Property Rights Hearing] (statement of Carol M. Rose, Gordon Bradford
Tweedy Professor of Law & Organization, Yale Law School), 1995 WL 152059.
141. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
142. Id. at 633.
143. Id.
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which would indicate the economic impact of the regulation. Instead of
looking at the parcel as a whole, the bill would allow the landowner to
claim a taking if the ESA’s prohibitions lowered the value of a portion of
her land. Compare this legislative approach with that of the Court.
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether the rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on
the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interfer144
ence with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .

If a landowner could be compensated for a percentage loss of any portion
of her parcel, the tribunals settling these claims would still need to ascertain
the relevant parcel, for “[t]o posit a 10% or 20% or 30% diminution in
value as a taking still does not answer the question, ‘percent of what?’”145
Recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, the Court answered that question and rejected the petitioners’ “conceptual severance” argument because it ignored Penn Central’s direction to consider the parcel as a whole.146
Furthermore, the legislative proposal would allow a landowner to manipulate her development plans to concentrate them in the area affected by
the legislation and thus receive compensation, even though the regulations
could have had a minimal economic impact but for her skewing her activities. The potential for such abuse is discussed more fully in the next section.
2. Potential for Abuse
Like the many compensation bills that preceded it, the Endangered
Species Land Management Reform Act is rife with potential for abuse.
Small landowners would not be the chief beneficiaries of such a provision.
Instead, entities with large holdings would be able to manipulate their development to take advantage of the compensation offered under the legislation. For example, Representative Sam Farr of California criticized a similar proposal, the Private Property Rights Act of 1995,147 because, in his
view, creating a right of compensation for a diminution of value of a por-

144. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
145. Private Property Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of Carol M. Rose, Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law & Organization, Yale Law School), 1995 WL 152059.
146. 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002).
147. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
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tion of one’s property would generate numerous bad faith claims.148 Landowners who had no reasonable, investment-backed expectations of profiting from the portion of the land affected by the Act could concoct plans to
focus development on the affected portion.149 In one floor debate, Representative Farr spun out the following worst-case scenario:
Just think, you can own a piece of land and you know that land may be
thousands of acres, but you have a couple of acres that are in wetlands.
Maybe you have a couple of acres that are in that habitat of an identified
endangered species; not the whole property, just that couple of acres.
You can say, “All right, I want to do all my development right on those
couple of acres.” You know that the government will prohibit you from
taking, and you can then say, “That is a taking. You have taken my land.
Compensate me for it. Then I am going to use that compensation to build
150
all over the rest of the land.”

Interestingly, large landowners will have a greater ability to manipulate
their land holdings to both the benefit and detriment of U.S. taxpayers. Under a scheme in which preserving a portion of one’s land for the listed species is required, large landowners are more able to adjust their development
plans to provide for such a preserve than small landowners are. This ability
to manipulate development could also be used to gain unjust compensation
by skewing development plans to concentrate the activity in the habitat areas. Thus large landowners could be the big winners under this legislation.
Representative Martin Olav Sabo pointed out a variation on this potential bad faith scheme. He opposed The Private Property Rights Act of
1995 in part because “[c]ompensation would be due even when the Government was simply denying permission for an activity that the landowner
knew would not be allowed when he acquired the land.”151 It is not difficult
to imagine sham acquisitions. Remember Sam Pullig of Belle Chase, Louisiana in Part III.A.1. and how an endangered species of bird was costing
him about $6,000 an ounce? Mr. Pullig knew the birds were nesting on the
land before he bought it for logging in 1993.152 Under the proposed compensation statutes, Mr. Pullig would have been compensated for his “loss.”

148. 141 CONG. REC. H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Farr); Private Property
Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL
152039.
149. See S. Rep. No. 104-239, at 58 (1996) (citing written statement of Prof. Carol M. Rose of Apr.
6, 1995 at 12-13 on the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 650, 104th Cong. (1995)).
150. 141 CONG. REC. H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Farr); Private Property
Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL
152039.
151. 141 Cong. REC. H2463 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Sabo).
152. Heather Dewar, supra note 110.
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3. Arbitration Not a Panacea
The Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act would have
provided a “choice of remedies,” giving the landowner the option of arbitration or civil litigation if she and the agency could not agree upon the
amount of compensation due.153 This choice, however, would not have necessarily made the process less expensive or complex. For example, one
would expect the parties frequently to disagree on the appropriate amount
of compensation, if any, and thus battle to demonstrate why the facts of the
particular situation merit the compensation each party proposes.
This choice of remedies also could create a windfall for attorneys involved in the resulting litigation or arbitration to settle disputes about the
fair market value of the parcel.154 Concurrently, this provision would increase the workload of the Service and the U.S. Department of Justice in
defending against these claims.155 One local government planning official
described such legislation as “‘a nightmare of dueling appraisers and dueling lawyers.”156 And these proposals were occurring “at a time when the
Government downsizing is the rallying cry.”157 Using either dispute resolution mechanism, each side would employ appraisers and the tribunal would
decide whose appraisal was accurate.158 Also, note that while this type of
legislation was pending, agricultural corporations—not family farmers—in
California’s Central Valley were already preparing lawsuits in anticipation
of the passage of this legislation.159

153. H.R. 1403, 107th Cong., § 2 (2001).
154. As Representative Conyers retorted in the Congressional floor debate trying to push through
another bill with similar provisions, “Better this bill be entitled ‘Bureaucrats and Lawyers Relief
Acts’?” CONG. REC. H2465 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995).
155.
Agencies would need to hire more employees to process compensation claims, more lawyers
to handle claims, more investigators and expert witnesses to determine the validity of claims,
more appraisers to assess the extent to which agency action has affected property value, and
more arbiters to resolve claims. The sheer volume of entitlement requests under these
schemes would be overwhelming. The result would be far more government, not less.
Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 605 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL 152039, at
*8. But see Tom Turner, Unsettling Development, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 32, 33 (arguing
that the Department of Justice is not defending the laws, is excluding intervenors who might defend the
law, and is quickly and quietly settling cases on highly favorable terms for the industry groups or states
who challenge the laws).
156. Charles McCoy, Private Matter: The Push to Expand Property Rights Stirs Both Hopes and
Fears, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995, at A1.
157. Id.
158. See id. (“‘Property owners will have their appraisers, and we’ll have ours, and we’ll go around
and around and around.’”).
159. See id. The Department of Agriculture’s latest Census of Agriculture indicates that 3% of the
farms in this country produce more than 60% of the country’s agricultural products. “The data offered
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Furthermore, while it is true that not everyone has the financial means
to sue the U.S. Government, arbitration is not without costs. The American
Arbitration Association’s initial filing fee and case service fee (due at the
first hearing) are based upon the amount of the claim and are set out below
in Figure 1.160
Figure 1 – AAA Initial Filing Fees
Amount of Claim
Above $0 to $10,000
Above $10,000 to $75,000
Above $75,000 to $150,000
Above $150,000 to $300,000
Above $300,000 to $500,000
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000
Above $1,000,000 to $5,000,000
Above $5,000,000 to $10,000,000
Above $10,000,000161

Initial
Filing Fee
$500
$750
$1,500
$2,750
$4,250
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000

Case
Service Fee
$200
$300
$750
$1,250
$1,750
$2,500
$3,250
$4,000

Thus, a claimant would pay between $700 and $14,000 for a case in which
a hearing was held for claims ranging from $0 to 10,000 up to claims of
$10 million.162 In addition to these fees, the parties are responsible for any
expenses of AAA representatives working on the claim.163
Then an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators would be selected. Currently,
the rules of the AAA provide that if the claim does not exceed $50,000, the
AAA will appoint a single arbitrator.164 If all the parties request a list of potential arbitrators, upon payment of a service charge the AAA will provide
such a list.165 Unlike litigation, wherein our system of checks and balances
has selected the judge, here either the AAA will choose the arbitrator or the
evidence that American farming is being powered more and more by size . . . .” Ira Dreyfuss, Big
Farms Continue to Squeeze Smaller Ones, HOUS. CHRON., June 4, 2004, at 3C.
160. American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for the Real Estate Industry (Including a
Mediation Alternative), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/
focusArea/commercial/AAA120current.htm (as amended and effective July 1, 2003).
161. Parties must contact their local AAA office for fees applicable for claims in excess of $10 million.
Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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property owner may have input on the choice, without regard to the competency of the owner to make a wise selection.
Then there is the cost of the arbitrator. Reviewing the resumes of the
265 mediators166 who list “construction” among their specialties reveals
that the average costs are $255 per hour for the mediator’s compensation
and $75.00 per hour for administrative fees.167 Mediators are paid at their
regular rates for study time (for such tasks as studying pre-hearing briefs
and exhibits168) as well as writing opinions or findings of facts and conclusions.169 Arbitrators are also paid for travel expenses including transportation, lodging, and meals if appropriate.170
Parties to arbitration also must pay the cost of a hearing room171 and
meeting rooms if appropriate. By contrast taxpayers pay the fees of the institution in litigation, i.e., the U.S. courts. A report by the public interest
group Public Citizen contends that the costs of arbitration will almost always be more than the costs of litigation.
The same support personnel that expedite cases at a courthouse, such as
file clerks and court administrators, are also necessary to manage arbitration cases. But because arbitration provider organizations handle fewer
cases over larger geographic areas, the economy of scale in a court
clerk’s office cannot be achieved, increasing the administrative cost per
case. Thus, while it costs the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County
an average of $44.20 to administer a case, AAA’s administrative cost per
172
case averages $340.63, about 700 percent more.

This report is not without its critics, however, who argue that the conclusions drawn are largely inapplicable to the typical lower-income claimant
involved in consumer and employment disputes.173 These critics cite the re-

166. Information regarding arbitrators is not publicly available. Presumably, their rates would be
comparable, if not higher.
167. Data compiled from resumes available at http://www.mediatorindex.com (fees range from $75
to $600 per hour).
168. The AAA lists among possible exhibits that could be relevant in this context, appraisal reports;
a survey of the parcel; real estate assessed valuation, appropriate local tax rates, and aggregate tax
charges; building plans and specifications; executed copies of leases in force; environmental audits; any
feasibility, market, or other advisory reports; and environmental impact studies. American Arbitration
Association, supra note 162.
169. http://www.mediatorindex.com (last visited May 5, 2004).
170. Id.
171. American Arbitration Association, supra note 162.
172. Public Citizen, The Costs of Arbitration (Apr. 2002), http://www.citizen.org/publications/
print_release.cfm?ID=7173#o.
173. Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen’s Jeremaiad on the “Costs of Arbitration”, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002/Jan. 2003, at 8, 10.
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port’s use of a dispute involving a $605,000 custom-designed home,174 but
for purposes of this analysis the size of that claim fits squarely within the
parameters of this private property rights conflict.175 For example, Margaret
Rector claimed that enforcement of the ESA caused her property to lose
approximately $800,000 in value. If she were to pursue arbitration under
the current rules, the initial filing fee would be $6,000 and for a hearing the
case service fee would be $2,500. On the other hand, if she filed her case in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Austin, her filing fee would be $150176 and there would be no “case service
fee.”
Then, of course, in arbitration each party has the option of being represented by counsel. One would not expect the hourly rates to be lower for
arbitration than for litigation. If fact, the rates may be greater in arbitration
because of the need for legal counsel experienced in arbitration and real estate.177
Even with these fee differentials and additional party-borne costs (arbitrator vs. judge; hearing room vs. courtroom), the total fees still have the
potential to be lower in arbitration than in litigation, however, because arbitration is usually a shorter process than litigation.178 Yet a recent survey of
commercial arbitrators showed that 72% of them “believe that arbitration is
becoming too much like court litigation and thereby losing its promise of
providing an expedited and cost-efficient means of resolving commercial
disputes.”179 Thus, the argument that arbitration uniformly is a better choice
than litigation for small or large private landowners is doubtful at best and
may lead to a wasting of the very resources the bill claims to protect.
174. Id. (comparing litigation and arbitration costs and pointing out how arbitration associations
have recently lowered fees for consumers and employees with businesses paying the bulk of the fees).
175. See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 93 (citing Margaret Rector’s market value loss of approximately
$800,000); Leslie Spencer, No Dream House for Mr. Burris, FORBES, July 18, 1994, at 78 (describing
Burris’ market value loss of approximately $1.5 million).
176. Fee Schedule for the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas at
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/fees/feesched.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
177. Compare MAXWELL J. FULTON, COMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 67-69
(1989) (“Most disputes now require an arbitrator who is more experienced in law than engineering and
who can assemble a team of specialist lawyers. An arbitrator who is acceptable to both parties may not
be available for more than 12 months and can cost several thousand dollars.”), and Harry Kaminsky,
Cave Arbitration? . . . Let’s Get Real!, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 31, 1994, at 11 (“savings are generally found
in the amount of attorneys fees paid as a result of limited discovery and decreased time involved in
achieving a final disposition”) (Kaminsky was a Regional Vice President of the American Arbitration
Association).
178. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration? DISP. RESOL. J., Feb./Apr.
2003, at 37, 39; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 678-79 (1996).
179. Phillips, supra note 180, at 37, 38.
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To assess the comparative societal values of binding arbitration and litigation one must analyze both the costs and benefits of the two alternatives. From a cost standpoint, not everyone would agree that binding arbitration is cheaper and quicker than litigation. As arbitrations become
more complex they become more like litigation and just as expensive.
Further, even to the extent one can show that resolving a case through
arbitration is cheaper than resolving the case through trial, the fact is that
most claims never make it to trial. To the extent that parties choose to
take a case to arbitration that either would not have been litigated or
would have settled quickly had it been litigated, arbitration may actually
180
increase societal costs.

Nothing ensures that the battle will be less costly with the American
Arbitration Association, for example, than in the courtroom. What is more,
unlike earlier versions of this bill,181 the Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act does not provide that a property owner who prevails
in arbitration is entitled to receive costs. Only through a civil action is the
owner entitled to receive reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation
costs, including appraisal fees.182 Also, going to arbitration does not assure
a property owner that she also will not be involved in litigation. The government may appeal the arbitration decision to a U.S. district court or to the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.183
B. The Appropriations Approach
Here is where the administration and Congress have joined ranks effectively to set the agenda for the Fish and Wildlife Service. Because the
Act has not been reauthorized, the administration must make a yearly
budget request to fund the activities of the Service. Not surprisingly, an increasing amount of money has been devoted to grants as opposed to enforcement or designation of critical habitat. The administration congratulates itself for requesting more total funds each year and then Congress in
turn gets to congratulate itself for appropriating even more money than requested. Yet the purposes of the increased appropriations are not manifest.
For example, even though the Service had a larger budget for FY 2003 than
FY 2002,184 it announced in March 2003 that it would be unable to designate critical habitat for 33 species before fiscal year-end September 30 be-

180. Sternlight, supra note 180, at 695.
181. Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 6(d) (1995).
182. Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act, H.R. 1403, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001).
183. Id. § (e)(2)(A).
184. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service at http://www.doi.gov/budget/2003/
03Hilites/BH53.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004).
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cause its $6 million budget was $2 million short.185 The same problem occurred in fiscal year 2002.186 The Service attributes the problem to litigation costs from both sides: environmental groups and developers.187 Yet although the number of lawsuits regarding critical habitat has been increasing
yearly since sometime during the Clinton Administration,188 the Bush Administration has not requested more money from Congress to deal with its
present reality.189
Though the head-line grabbers of the 104th Congress and forward dealt
with such bills as the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995,190 the Private
Property Owners’ Bill of Rights,191 the Landowners Equal Treatment
Act,192 and the Life, Liberty, and Property Protection Act,193 Congress also
tried to make substantive changes to the ESA through riders on appropriations bills.194 As John Leshy, the Solicitor for the Department of Interior
from 1993 until 2001, so colorfully explained, “The Interior Appropriations
bill seemed to attract mischievous riders like flies. The White House led the
mostly successful fight against them, but it often required a substantial personal commitment of the Secretary.”195 Notwithstanding this commitment,
apparently former Secretary Babbitt engaged in this appropriations game as
well to prevent the use of other funds to address critical habitat, fearing that
the lawsuits and the resultant studies would deplete the Service’s resources
so that it could not perform many of its other functions.196 As attorneys for
the EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund described the situation,

185. Jennifer 8. Lee, Money Gone, U.S. Suspends Designations of Habitats, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2003, at A18.
186. See U.S. Dept. of Interior, Press Release: Endangered Species Act Broken—Flood of
Litigation over Critical Habitat Hinders Species Conservation available at http://endangered.fws.gov/
criticalhabitat/ch_pressrelease.pdf (May 28, 2003).
187. Id.
188. Lee, supra note 185.
189. Id.
190. S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995).
191. S. 953, 105th Cong. (1997).
192. H. R. 1142, 106th Cong. (1999)
193. H.R. 5709, 107th Cong. (2002).
194. E.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense
to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, ch. 4, 109 Stat. 73, 86
(1995) (creating moratorium on listing species and designating critical habitat by rescinding funds to
Interior).
195. Leshy, supra note 64, at 209. Though these efforts to amend the Act through such riders were
largely unsuccessful when former President Bill Clinton was in office, with Republicans controlling the
White House and the legislature, however, one commentator has predicted the revival of this strategy.
Dan Fagin, A New Environment: Bush Seeks to Reshape Laws of the Land (and Air), NEWSDAY, Jan.
12, 2003, at A04.
196. Lee, supra note 185. For example, the budget for 2003 provides that funds—
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For fiscal year 1998, for instance, the service [sic] asked for a tiny
budget increase of $190,000 for the listing and critical habitat program,
for a grand total of $5.19 million for the entire year—less than 7% of the
entire endangered species budget, and less than any other agency budget
request since the early [Former President George H.W.] Bush years.
Only rarely will Congress exceed a presidential budget request, and the
FWS duly received the starvation diet it had requested.
Even more mind-boggling is that in fiscal 1997, 1998, and 1999 the FWS
also specially demanded that Congress limit its budget for critical habitat
designation and listing. The House Conference Report on the 1998
budget specifically reflects DOI’s role in obtaining a budget cap: “As requested by the Department of the Interior, the managers reluctantly have
agreed to limit statutorily the funds for the endangered species listing
197
program.”

This insistence on a limited budget for section 4 activities provides
support for these lawyers’ further contention that the FWS unilaterally decided that the designation of critical habitat was an expensive and worthless
process, though there was no actual amendment of the statute.198 In their
estimation, the FWS had succumbed to the will of private property rights
groups and developers199 and had freed itself from complying with law.200
“At its bottom, the tactic is nothing less than collusion between the execu-

not to exceed $9,077,000 shall be used for implementing subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) of
section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, as amended, for species that are indigenous to the
United States (except for processing petitions, developing and issuing proposed and final
regulations, and taking any other steps to implement actions described in subsection
(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)(i), or (c)(2)(B)(ii)), of which not to exceed $6,000,000 shall be used for
any activity regarding the designation of critical habitat, pursuant to subsection (a)(3), excluding litigation support, for species already listed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) as of the date of
enactment this Act.
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 220-21 (2002). See
also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-63,
115 Stat. 414, 419 (2001) (limiting to $9 million the amount to be used to implement subsection (a), (b),
(c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-201, 114 Stat. 922, 926 (2000) (limiting to $6,355,000 the amount to be
used to implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA), Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-139 (1999); Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-236
(1998) (limiting to $5,756,000 the amount to be used to implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of
section 4 of the ESA); Appropriations for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-83, 111 Stat. 1543, 1547 (1997) (limiting to $5,190,000 the amount to be use for
implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA).
197. Robert Wiygul & Heather Weiner, Critical Habitat Destruction, THE ENVTL. FORUM,
May/June 1999, at 13, 18.
198. Id. at 13.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 16.
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tive and the Congress to weaken a popular substantive law in a way that
keeps the public out of the loop.”201
Bush’s proposed 2004 Budget provides $129 million for the endangered species program. This budget request is said to include a 35 percent
increase for the listing program to handle litigation. In contrast, the administration anticipates dispersing $822 million through grants, including $50
million for the Landowner Incentive and Private stewardship programs.202
C. The End Result in Congress
Some may consider Congress to have failed miserably in its efforts to
change species protection.203 The parade of bills, falling by the wayside
session after session, has been described as a “successful juggernaut” in
that Congress has kept the agency from moving forward with some needed
changes. But it has been successful in another way as well. As one commentator observed,
Democrats still have enough leverage to block major legislation in the
closely divided Senate and House, but Bush now has a freer hand to
make policy changes through administrative actions in key agencies such
as the Interior Department . . . . That’s because agency officials will no
longer face hostile scrutiny from Democratic Senate committee chairs
204
with the power to convene oversight hearings and issue subpoenas.

Indeed, this “successful juggernaut” has laid the groundwork for that which
the Executive Branch is evolving. As J.B. Ruhl has explained, legislative
proposals were nothing but “wish lists” for both sides.205 He predicted that
Congress would not makes any changes to the ESA, but “[i]nstead, rhetori-

201. Id. at 18.
202. OMB, Department of Interior, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/
interior.html (last visited May 5, 2004).
203. Although the U.S. Congress has been unsuccessful in passing any “takings” legislation, many
states have been successful. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1311 to -1313 (West 1999 & Supp.
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-20-201 to -205 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605
(1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 1998); Idaho Code §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Michie 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-32 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -711 (Supp.
2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3609-3:3611 (West Supp. 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341
(West Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.421 to -425 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.017 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §
2-10-101 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.425 (Michie 1995); N.M.STAT. ANN. § 74-6-12 (Michie
Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02.5 (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.772 (1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to -206 (Supp. 1998); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.001 (Vernon Supp.
2000). UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-2 to -4 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:7.1 (Michie 1998); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-1A-1 to -6 (1998); WYO.
STAT. ANN § 9-5-301 (Michie 2001).
204. Fagin, supra note 195.
205. See Ruhl, supra note 64, at 369.
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cal, picky, and amorphous statutory reform has been proposed which operates at the periphery of the matter and leaves the most difficult questions to
the agencies that implement the law.”206
In reading this Part of the Article, the following question may have
arisen: where is the counter-rhetoric by environmental interests groups and
liberals? Part V will provide the contours of that counter-rhetoric before
going on to examine how well the Executive Branch has taken its cues
from Congress.
V. THE COUNTER-RHETORIC AGAINST “ROLLBACKS”
Environmentalists and Democrats have countered the reformists’
rhetoric by characterizing the proposals as “rollbacks” of environmental
protection.207 In many ways, one could say that the counter-rhetoric of
“rollbacks” versus “reforms” has been successful in that Congress has been
unable to weaken significantly species protection despite trying to for almost ten years. But several dangers lurk ahead for the environmental
movement. One is the concern that its message is no longer appealing to
the mainstream; instead these groups are viewed as extremists. The images
of cuddly creatures such as the World Wildlife Foundation’s panda bear, or
stately creatures such as the bald eagle, are fairing poorly against the constant imagery of small landowners and simple communities caught in the
crossfire between human development and species protection. Moreover,
the Republican leadership has realized that wholesale reform will not be
successful and has instead opted for more subtle changes that have enormous potential. Representative Richard Pombo, chair of the House Resources Committee says that he will no longer try to amend the Act in one
sweeping piece of legislation, but instead will “break it down” one piece at
a time.208 And unfortunately, it will be more difficult for environmental interests groups to engage and impassion the public over changes that appear
to be mostly procedural.209

206. Id. at 370.
207. E.g., Leshy, supra note 64, at 204; Joel Connelly, Environmental Groups Target Suburban
Voters, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 29, 1998, at B1; Timothy Noah, GOP’s Rollback of the
Green Agenda is Stalled by a Public Seeing Red Over Proposed Changes, WALL ST. J., DEC. 26, 1995,
at A8.
208. Erica Werner, Endangered Species Act Targeted: House Resources Chairman Plans to ‘Break
it Down’, WASH. POST, Jan.13, 2004, at A15.
209. See id.
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A. The Environmental Interest Groups
National environmental interest groups somehow arguably have become known as extreme or largely irrelevant to the average citizen’s life.
For example, one group of communications scholars analyzed the use of
the term “tree-hugger” in newspapers in the spring of 1999210 and found
that the use of the term may be characterized as “reduction to absurdity,”211
making “environmentalists and their positions appear unrealistic and foolish.”212 The term is used as “attack discourse”213 to ridicule214 and delegitimize215 the movement and its advocates. The mental imagery of this term is
too concrete216 and comical217 to be of great use to the environmental
movement. As evidence of its extreme connotations, the term has been used
as a rhetorical “moderating device,”218 according to this study, to define an
advocate’s position as something less than radical.219 Indeed one conservative analyst offered that “‘environmentalists realize they are in a ghetto,
and they are trying to figure out a way out of it,’ said Myron Ebell, an environmental analyst at the conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute.
‘They’re realizing that these things relate to people’s lives and not just
wonky policy debates.’”220
Against the Bush Administration, national environmental interest
groups are coming on strong with the rhetoric, however. For example, the
Natural Resources Defense Council’s report on the Bush Administration’s
environmental policy characterized the administration as a greater threat
than any posed since the advent of the environmental movement in 1970.
“Environmental protections have been challenged before, most notably in
the James Watt era and in the Newt Gingrich Congress, but never through a
campaign as far-reaching and destructive as the threat posed today by the
Bush Administration and the 108th Congress.”221 It is unclear whether this

210. Michael DeLoach, et al., An Analysis of the “Tree-Hugger” Label in ENVIROPOP 95, 96-97
(Mark Meister & Phyllis M. Japp, eds. 2002).
211. Id. at 97.
212. Id. at 98.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 105.
215. Id. at 98.
216. Id. at 100.
217. Id. at 105.
218. Id. at 102.
219. Id.
220. Katharine Q. Seelye, Democratic Field Tries to Add Punch to Environment Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2003, at A22.
221. Robert Perks & Gregory Wetstone, Rewriting the Rules, Year-End Report 2002: The Bush
Administration’s Assault on the Environment iv, at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/rollbacks/
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rhetoric will shift policy, but as a consultant for the Sierra Club who
worked to counter some Republican rhetoric remarked, “‘It’s like a tennis
game. The ball is back in our court, and we need to spend time and energy
educating voters.’”222
B. The Democratic Party
The Democrats are realizing that to defend effectively against threats
to species protection, they need to develop a framework for counterrhetoric and information. Professor Zygmunt Plater made the following observation with respect to public interest cases: “it ultimately is the public’s
perception of the case that is the most important and determinative factor.
What the public knows (or, significantly, does not know) of the case, ultimately determines outcomes.”223 And arguably the same is true with respect to legislation and policy. Some Democrats are forming “a political
research institute in an effort to counter what they see as the domination of
the national political debate by well-organized, well-financed conservatives
at the White House, in Congress, and in a variety of media and policy institutes all over Washington.”224 As Carol Browner, EPA Administrator during the Clinton Administration noted, “‘The conservative movement has
been effective in building the echo chamber for themselves . . . both
through the media—talk radio, Fox News, The Weekly Standard—and
through effective institutions like the Heritage Foundation, which reinforces their ideas and focuses on communicating them.’”225
Congressional Democrats are working to disseminate information
about the Bush Administration’s environmental policies226 and the Department of Interior’s record.227 The Democratic presidential candidates for the
2004 election are changing their rhetoric as well to begin telling stories as

execsum.asp (January 2003); see also The Bush Archives, at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/
bush_archive.asp (last visited Feb. 20 2004) (criticizing the Bush Administration record on the
environment); Green Peace at http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/index.fpl?article=422&object_id=8035
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (calling President Bush “The Toxic Texan”).
222. See Jennifer 8. Lee, A Call for Softer, Greener Language, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A24.
223. Plater, supra note 3, at 2.
224. Katharine Q. Seelye, Democrats, Seeing Dominance of Conservatives’ Message, Form Group
to Fight It, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at A31.
225. Id.
226. United State House of Representatives, Comm. on Gov’t Reform – Minority Staff, Special
Investigations Division, Politics and Science in the Bush Administration 2 at
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf (Nov. 13,
2003) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
227. Democratic Staff of Comm. on Resources, Weird Science: The Interior Department’s Manipulation of Science for Political Purposes at http://www.ourforests.org/weirdscience.pdf (Dec. 17, 2002)
(Rep. Nick J. Rahall, Ranking Member).
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opposed to referring to scientific data. For example, in support of air regulations, they are talking about children with asthma, and with respect to the
clean-up of hazardous waste they are pointing out that many more minorities than whites live near toxic waste dumps.228 As former Governor of
Vermont Dr. Howard Dean offered, “his fellow Democrats should speak
concretely rather than in abstractions, and so link environmental problems
with real-world consequences. Instead of talking about greenhouse gases,”
Dr. Dean said, “they should talk about what it is like to take a child to the
emergency room because of an asthma attack.”229
“The Democrats old approach largely motivated a set of activists,”
Mr. Podesta, said, but “hadn’t had as broad a reach as a voting issue into
the general public.”230 As the Luntz memo points out, the term “environmentalists” has a negative connotation,231 perhaps that of an activist,
whereas “conservationists” are reasonable, moderate, and practical.232 Democrats are now trying to extend their appeal to minorities, independents,
and “queasy suburban Republicans.”233 Mr. Ebell of the Competitive Enterprise Institute says that the Democratic message is “so shrill and so at
odds with reality” that it does not resonate in states other than California,
Massachusetts, and New York, states where Democrats already win.234 Juxtaposing this rhetoric, the Bush Administration appears to be more intuitive
and widely appealing, describing the plight of America as an entire country, not just those of small landowners.
VI. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S RHETORIC
Because the reform horror stories may support one political worldview
or value system over another, their propagation also depends on the policy
or rhetorical goals of an administration. These stories may take on an even
broader sweep as they seek to define general principles of law. Examples
from the current administration include Department of Interior Secretary
Gale Norton’s 4Cs: “communication, consultation and cooperation, all in
service of conservation.” This mantra is not about the ruination of one
farmer or one small landowner but rather the destruction of whole commu-

228. Seelye, supra note 220.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Luntz Memo, supra note 85, at 142, at http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/Luntz
Research.Memo.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004).
232. Id.
233. Seelye, supra note 220.
234. Id.
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nities by insensitive legislators and bureaucrats.235 For example, rural
ranching communities of the “Mountain West”236 have been held up as victims of environmental policies developed by federal officials who are characterized by some as being unresponsive to local concerns.237 The popular
conception is that environmental restrictions on extraction of natural resources are strangling the economy through elimination of the region’s
only high-wage jobs.238 The basic understanding is as follows:
1. Every economy has a base.
2. The Mountain West’s economic base is its natural resources industry,
which is on the decline.
239
3. The Mountain West economy is on the decline.

Industry, politicians, and news media have painted a rather bleak picture of
that regional economy.240 And what is rather clever about this story is that
it turns private interests—those of the natural resources industry—into
something that looks like a public interest—that of the entire region.241
Two economists from the University of Montana, Thomas Michael Power
and Richard N. Barrett, however, have researched and written extensively

235. But see P. Lynn Scarlett, A New Approach to Conservation: The Case for the Four CS, 17
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 73, 112 (2002) (arguing that the Dept. of the Interior is “developing a four
Cs new environmentalism framework by exploring ways to . . . enhance landowner and other citizen
participation in public land management decisions, to reduce procedural hurdles, and to dismantle bureaucratic barriers.”).
236. The Mountain States are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming. BARRETT & POWER, supra note 87, at xvii.
237. See id. at 13, 17-18; See also 141 CONG. REC. S6339 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (characterizing the ESA as pitting “working people” and “their families” against “uncompromising, intrusive, and unrelenting Federal mandates.”).
238. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 17-18; See also 141 CONG. REC. S7612 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Craig) (“The practice of forestry is at a standstill on our western public lands, and the
primary culprit is the Endangered Species Act.”).
239. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 125. See also 141 Cong. REC. S6340 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (explaining how the Service’s listing of the Northern Spotted Owl in 1989 as endangered caused the following chain of events: a decline in timber industry, a rise in unemployment,
families falling apart, an increase in divorce and domestic violence, “skyrocking” use of foodbanks, a
rise in sale of homes, and ultimately “once proud, and productive members of our society . . . becom[ing] society’s burden.”).
240. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 133-34; See e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S6340 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Gorton).
241. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 125-26. Power and Barrett define “cowboy economics” as the conventional understanding of the regional economy that is at odds with the reality of
our national market economy and how it effects regional economies. Id. at xix. Their book is an attempt
to provide a more accurate view, that is, “post-cowboy economics.” Id. at xix-xx. See also 141 CONG.
REC. S6340 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (focusing on the plight of “timber communities,” family,
and individuals rather than the timber companies).
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to try to debunk this myth.242 Images of open-pit mines, farms, and ranches,
however, distort the communities’ understanding of its current and evolving economic base. New jobs are found in small firms and anonymous office buildings, not out on the range.243 Moreover, these economists argue
that not only is the story inaccurate in saying that environmental law detrimentally affects the region’s economy, but environmental law actually
“enhances welfare and protects the very source of economic vitality that the
Mountain West enjoys.”244 Despite this research to the contrary, the Bush
Administration forges ahead with stories about the need to balance the environment and the economy, and accordingly promotes such programs as
Clear Skies and Healthy Forests.
A. Clear Skies, Healthy Forests, and other Euphemisms
In 2002, the White House launched two environmental initiatives:
Clear Skies245 and Healthy Forests.246 President Bush described the Clear
Skies legislation as a new approach “based on this common-sense idea: that
economic growth is key to environmental progress, because it is growth
that provides the resources for investment in clean technologies.”247 He
touted this program as combining “the power of markets, the creativity of
entrepreneurs, and . . . the best scientific research.”248 According to President Bush, the proposed legislation would “dramatically reduce the three
most significant forms of pollution from power plants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury.”249
Environmental groups,250 Democratic presidential candidates, and oth251
ers quickly criticized the plan as a mere weakening of the Clean Air Act.

242. POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 133-34; See e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S6340 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
243. POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 131.
244. Id. at xix. Though salaries may be low compared to other regions of the country, the amenities
are high and attract many of the new residents of the region. See id. at xviii, 17-18.
245. Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003); Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999,
108th Cong. (2003).
246. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. (2003).
247. George W. Bush, President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives, Address at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland (Feb. 14, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., The Bush Administration’s Air Pollution Plan, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/
qbushplan.asp (Sept. 5, 2003) (describing the initiative as the “misnamed ‘Clear Skies’ initiative, which
would gut existing health protections and do nothing to curb global warming”).
251. See, e.g., Empty Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A28; Patrick Leahy, President Bush’s
‘Clear Skies’ Plan Would Hurt Northeast Most of All, at http://leahy.senate.govpress/200204/
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For example, the Sierra Club described the initiative as “a smokescreen for
more pollution.”252 And presidential candidate Reverend Al Sharpton described the Clear Skies proposal as being nothing more than a gift from
President Bush to his corporate supporters.253
The Healthy Forests Initiative has not faired much better among those
groups. This initiative was billed as making our forests “healthy” by thinning undergrowth and brush to prevent forest fires.254 Touring an area severely damaged by forest fires, President Bush stated, “[t]oo many communities like this have known too many hardships that fire causes . . . .
We’ve got a problem in the country, a problem which has built up over
decades and a problem we’d better fix before more people go through the
grief the people of Summerhaven have gone through.”255
Some environmentalists called President Bush’s Healthy Forests Initiative the “Horizontal Forest Initiative” because it is less about “fuel reduction”—the process of reducing forest material that could fuel a fire—
than about catering to the timber industry.256 The new legislation provides
federal money for commercial logging in national forests,257 but it does not
provide any money for fuel reduction on private land “where it is needed to
safeguard commercial and residential development.”258 Moreover, Representative Jay Inslee of Washington State criticized the legislation as not
providing enough money to the Forest Service. Without more money, he
says, the Forest Service will have a greater incentive to allow the logging
of more valuable old-growth stands in order to pay for the thinning.259
Similarly, “[e]nvironmental groups contend that the legislation will enable
timber companies to log healthy trees and will not do enough to reduce the
042202c.html (“The Administration’s ‘Clear Skies’ initiative is more fitting for April Fool’s Day than
for Earth Day.”) (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
252. President Bush’s New “Clear Skies” Proposal: A Smokescreen for More Pollution, at
http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/clear_skies.asp (Feb. 22, 2002).
253. Seelye, supra note 220.
254. George W. Bush, President Announces Healthy Forest Initiative, Remarks by the President on
Forest Health and Preservation, The Compton Arena, Central Point, Oregon (Aug. 22, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020822-3.html.
255. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Promotes Healthy Forests in Arizona (Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030811-4.html .
256. Healthy Forests: Proposal More Logging Bill than Forest Fire Prevention, HOUS. CHRON.
Aug. 14, 2003, at 32A.
257. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, § 108, 117 Stat. 1887 (2003).
258. Healthy Forests: Proposal More Logging Bill than Forest Fire Prevention, HOUS. CHRON., at
32A. See also Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Flies over Fire Site to Promote ‘Healthy Forests’, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2003, at A10 (quoting president of Wilderness Society who charges that initiative does nothing to make people safer).
259. Mike Soraghan, Forest-thinning Funds Modest Plan Called Thrifty; Dems Cry Sellout, DENV.
POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at A4.
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fire danger to homes. ‘There’s a real danger that the president’s pen might
as well be a chainsaw,’ said Amy Mall, a forest specialist with the Natural
Resources Defense Council.”260 Or as one resource conservation professor
described the situation, “[t]his is like letting the fox guard the henhouse.”261
One such unlikely protector of listed species is Secretary Norton.262 She too
has a story to tell.
B. The Four C’s or the Three M’s?
Secretary Norton explains her approach to regulation as the “4 C’s”:
communication, consultation and cooperation, all in service of conservation. She believes that the agency should be considering more “the role
nonregulatory conservation—the willing partnerships between citizens and
all levels of government—can play.”263 In an op-ed regarding the protection
of wetlands, Norton extolled the virtues of partners programs through
which the federal government provides funds and technical assistance to
individuals and groups to rehabilitate wetlands.264 However, Secretary Norton is not without her critics.
Some of her critics call Norton’s signature phrase the “Three M’s:
maddening, meaningless mantra.”265 Though her words may appear uncontroversial and daresay enchanting, they are stirring up considerable opposition. This language has softened what is perceived by environmentalists as
the Bush Administration’s attack on the environment. Advised by a party
strategist, Republican politicians have changed their rhetorical approach
with respect to environmental issues to appeal to suburban voters.266 As the
260. Elizabeth Shogren & Richard Simon, New Forest-Thinning Policy Drops Safeguard for Wildlife, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A19.
261. Michael Hill, The Political Environment, BALT. SUN, Dec. 14, 2003 at 1C (quoting Sandy
Parker of the Department of Geography and Environmental Systems at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County).
262. See e.g., Michael Powell, The Westerner’s Interior Motives; To Gale Norton, Ranchers and
Environmentalists Don’t Have to Be at Loggerheads, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001, at C1 (describing
Gale Norton as a “rebel occup[ying] the palace” and a “Western politician who waged a decades-long
war against the distant bureaucracies at Interior, one of those conservatives who fancy themselves guerrilla fighters against Washington’s command-and-control regimens.”); Douglas Jehl, Transition in
Washington: The Interior Department; Interior Choice Faces Sharp Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2001, at A30 (discussing the advertisement, paid for by a coalition of eighteen environmental groups,
which describes Gale Norton as “‘so far on the fringe’ that ‘she’s off the page’” and stating “‘America
deserves an interior secretary who will protect our air, water and natural resources not the polluters who
seek to exploit them’”).
263. Gale Norton & Ann Veneman, There’s More than One Way to Protect Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2003, at A25.
264. Id.
265. John Tierny, Trying for Balance at Interior, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A26.
266. See Lee, supra note 222.
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president of the Environmental Working Group noted with respect to the
Bush Administration, “They are showing the message discipline they need
to get these anti-environmental policies past suburban voters.”267
Below, this Article attempts to flesh out the contours of Norton’s philosophy and to determine what is lurking behind it. Though public explanations of this philosophy are scant at best,268 the Department of Interior’s actions speak louder than any slogan its chief administrator may chant.
1. Communication
Secretary Norton says that she is working to change the tone of political discussions regarding environmental protection. She opines that “[t]oo
often political conversation becomes bitter and divisive.269 Too often the
casualties of this culture of partisan conflict are the very creatures and
places that both sides are seeking to defend.”270 She believes that the federal government should be communicating with local property owners,
elected officials, and others whose lives would be affected by federal action.271 Here the idea is that local expertise will lead to solutions that are
better than those emanating from administrators and theorists in Washington, DC.272
Perhaps the Department of Interior plans to follow EPA’s lead in this
area. EPA had increased the quantity and quality of information available
to the public.273 Yet critics of EPA’s approach say that these programs are
just an attempt to improve public relations and not meaningful involvement
or participation by the public.274 Currently, the Department of Interior has
no formal or specific mechanism for fostering the type of communication
that Norton advocates.

267. Id. But see Christie Whitman, The Vital Republican Center, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at A19
(“Some Republican consultants say that since we’re not going to win the votes of environmentalists
anyway, we needn’t worry about what they think. Yet there are plenty of voters who care about the environment, even if it’s not the first thing they mention in polls.”).
268. Scarlett, supra note 235, at 74 (explaining that the “4Is”—innovation, incentives, information,
and integrated-decision-making—gird the 4Cs).
269. Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the National Newspaper Association (Mar. 23, 2001), at http://www.doi.gov./news/010323.html.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Scarlett, supra note 235, at 76.
273. See J. Charles Fox, A Real Public Role, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 19-20. In
2003, EPA issued a new “Public Involvement Policy.” 69 Fed. Reg. 33,946 (June 6, 2003). The
guidance for implementing this policy can be found at http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/
policy2003/guidance.pdf (May 2003). See generally the EPA’s website regarding public involvement at
http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/ (last updated Mar. 9, 2004).
274. Lisa Pelstring, Good Start, Long Way To Go, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 22-23.
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Despite this call for greater local involvement, environmentalists criticize, for example, Norton’s new policy that prevents the Bureau of Land
Management from protecting 600,000 acres in Colorado that Representative Diana DeGette has proposed to be designated as wilderness.275 The
policy is the result of settlement with the state of Utah, yet it was developed
without public input.276 Conservationists are essentially arguing that Norton
selectively applies her 4C’s philosophy in similar situations. Some communities have been allowed to participate while others have not.277 Though
on the one hand the Bush Administration seems to have signaled that it will
listen to local governments and user groups in way that the Clinton Administration did not,278 critics are concerned that the Bush Administration’s
actions may be designed to shut out some voices while privileging others.
Also, the Bush Administration’s efforts to “streamline” the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) convey quite a different message than
its rhetoric about its desire to include the public in the decision-making
process.279 In 2002, the CEQ created the NEPA Task Force to study how
the processes of NEPA could be improved and modernized.280 “Republicans and their allies say the drive to change NEPA is aimed at . . . making
sure that agencies listen to the people and companies, who are most affected by their decisions. ‘If we can streamline NEPA, we’re going to finally get many of these [logging] projects moving,’ said Tom Partin of the
Oregon-based American Forest Resource Council,”281 a trade association
for timber interests.282 However, critics argue that the Task Force’s actual
goal is to limit public access to environmental policymaking and information.283 As Carl Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club, contends,
“[t]he administration knows that if it can get the public out of the process
the power relationships will change, and then they’ll be able to change the
policy.”284
275. Theo Stein, BLM Planning Effort Lauded: Interior Chief Says Colorado Canyons Process
Successful, DENV. POST, July 6, 2003, at A-24.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Fagin, supra note 195.
279. Id.
280. 67 Fed. Reg. 45,510 (July 9, 2002).
281. Fagin, supra note 195.
282. “The American Forest Resource Council strives to provide a positive operating environment
for the forest products community, representing nearly 100 forest product manufacturers and forest
landowners—from small, family-owned companies to large multi-national corporations—in twelve
states, west of the Great Lakes.” American Forest Resource Council, at http://www.afrc.ws/ (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004).
283. Fagin, supra note 195.
284. Id.
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One of the suggestions for streamlining the process is directing agencies to create more categorical exclusions—using broad criteria—for projects that do not significantly impact the environment to give the agencies
greater flexibility in determining which actions would require an Environmental Impact Statement.285 Although CEQ Chairman James Connaughton
said that they were working towards a more timely and collaborative process that is therefore more efficient,286 some environmentalists such as an
attorney for the National Resources Defense Council respond that “[t]heir
focus is on speed rather than on meaningful public participation and environmental review.”287
“This administration has actively supported greatly expanding the list of
activities that would be put in this category because once it’s in this
category you don’t have the ‘nuisance’ of public participation,” said
‘Robert B. Smythe, an environmental consultant and White House official in the Ford and Carter administrations. “The language appears to
provide some basis for reopening the question of categorical exclusions
288
without any substantive justification.”

2. Consultation
Though generalized accounts of what Norton means by “consultation”
are elusive, with respect to the ESA she appears to be referring to the expansion of the section 7 process by having the Service “consult” with private landowners as well as federal agencies. The current provisions of the
Act only require consultation with private landowners when there is a “federal nexus,” that meaning whenever an agency of the federal government
must provide a permit, license, or other authorization for the development
to proceed. Without consultation, a private landowner must satisfy the requirements of section 10 with her own resources.
Through the Consultation program, the Service works with private landowners and other non-Federal entities to develop Habitat Conservation
Plans that authorize the incidental take of listed species. The HCP process allows private economic development to proceed while promoting
289
listed species conservation.

285. The NEPA Task Force Report to the Council on Environmental Quality, Modernizing NEPA
Implementation at 57-63 (Sept. 2003), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/report/; John Heilprin, Environmental Study Exemption Recommended/Report also Calls for New Rules for Managing Natural
Resources, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2003, at A2; Michael Burnham, Regulations: CEQ Panel Suggests
Measures for Reforming Environmental Review Process, GREENWIRE, Sept. 24, 2003, at 2.
286. John Heilprin, supra note 285.
287. Burnham, supra note 287.
288. Eric Pianin, Panel Backs Faster Environment Review, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003 at A31.
289. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10.
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Through a policy initiative, the Service is able to accomplish what the 103d
Congress could not accomplish.290 For example, in 1993 Senator Kempthorne proposed a bill that would allow any person—even in the absence of
a “federal nexus”—to initiate consultation with the Secretary if that person
thought her activities could have an effect on a listed species.291 The potential benefits of invoking section 7, as discussed in Part II.C supra, include
that the Secretary must act on the petition within ninety days,292 whereas
under section 10, there is no limit to the amount of time the Secretary may
take to review an incidental take permit application.293
The proposed bills and Norton’s new policy of offering the potential
benefits of consultation were designed to address the criticism that the burdens associated with preparing an HCP under section 10 overwhelm all but
the largest of landowners.294 Yet despite the numerous accounts that the
current HCP process fails small landowners, John Sawhill, former President and CEO of The Nature Conservancy, painted a slightly different picture when faced with the question of whether section 10 is a viable option
for small landowners. He argued that:
Carried out as Congress intended, . . . the Section 10(a) process is a viable option for small private landowners . . . For example the
[RHCP] . . . [for Austin,] Texas, has been proven through several detailed economic studies to be the most economical alternative for private
landowners in a setting where many are vying for land development
permits. Not only is it more efficient than every individual attempting to
comply with the ESA alone under any mechanism, but also the unit cost
of compliance is dramatically reduced. The official economic study . . .
showed that participation in the plan by small landowners reduced their
295
financial obligation of compliance by 85%.

It may be true that the American public wishes to pay more of the cost of
species protection on private lands by expanding the applicability of sec-

290. See, e.g., Endangered Species Reform Act of 1995, S. 768, 104th Cong, §§ 401-06 (1995);
Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 199, H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. § 203; The
Endangered Species Act Procedural Reform Amendments of 1993, H.R. 1490, 103d Cong. § 108
(1993).
291. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1995, S. 1364, 104th Cong. § 12(a) (1994).
292. Id.
293. See Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 398 (1986) (stating that studies for all but
the smallest HCPs require several months or years to complete before an HCP can be finalized).
294. See, e.g., The Role of Habitat Conservation Hearing, supra note 55, at 79 (“The current section 10 process is not a viable option for the ‘little guy.’ The costs, time requirements, and uncertainties
of section 10 HCPs prohibit most landowners from using them.”) (testimony of Ed Sauls, The Sauls
Company & member, National Association of Homebuilders). Interestingly, this criticism is often
launched by representatives of large landowners.
295. Id. at 49-60.
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tion 7. No consensus has arisen in Congress, however, and the agency has
not provided the public with a formal opportunity to comment on the expansion. Instead the agency has taken the lead in effect to amend the Act,
without any of the Constitutional safeguards associated with lawmaking.
Contrast this initiative to increase consultation with private landowners with the Bush Administration’s move to eliminate consultation with
agencies under certain circumstances. For example, in December 2003, the
Services along with the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park
Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forest Service (“Action
Agencies”) issued joint “counterpart” consultation regulations.296 These
regulations provide an “optional alternative” to the existing consultation
process for agency projects that support the National Fire Plan (“NFP”) under the Healthy Forests Initiative.297 The optional alternative “eliminates
the need to conduct informal consultations and eliminates the requirement
to obtain a written concurrence from the Service for those NFP actions that
the Action Agency determines are ‘not likely to adversely affect’
(“NLAA”) any listed species or designated critical habitat.”298 These regulations are intended to accelerate the rate at which the Action Agencies
may implement their responsibilities under the NFP.299 What is significant
about the alternative is that if the Action Agency has entered into an “Alternative Consultation Agreement”, it may make an NLAA determination
without consultation with or concurrence of the Service.300
There were many criticisms of the rule when it was proposed and they
included three general categories of concerns: urgency, expertise, and capture. Commenters on the proposed ruled expressed doubt about the need to
accelerate the current process301 and suggested that rather than delegating
authority to the Action Agencies, the Service could shorten the timeline for
formal consultations and biological opinions.302 Another critique of this
delegation was that the Action Agencies lacked the requisite expertise.303
And finally opposition arose from the concern that the Action Agencies’
missions differ from that of the Services and thus the Action Agencies
296. Counterpart Regulations for Implementing the National Fire Plan, 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.31-.34
(2004).
297. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,254-02, 68,255 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
298. Id. at 68,254-02.
299. Id.
300. Counterpart Regulations for Implementing the National Fire Plan, 50 C.F.R. § 402.33 (2004).
301. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,258-02 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
302. Id. at 68,260.
303. Id. at 68,258.
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would be less sensitive to protection of listed species and critical habitat.
Moreover, commenters speculated that the alternative would give industry
“free reign” to increase timber sales on public lands in a manner that is not
in the best interest of the public.304 The current consultation process was
seen as part of the “checks and balances inherent in the Act.”305 This new
regulation did not receive much media attention,306 though its ramifications
could be significant.
Receiving more media attention, however, was the Service’s promulgation in August 2004 of counterpart consultations with EPA and the Department of Agriculture with respect to pesticides for actions taken under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.307 These regulations provide two optional alternatives.308 The first is similar to the December 2003 regulation in that it allows EPA to make NLAA determinations
without consultation with or concurrence from the Service.309 Criticisms
were likewise similar.310 The second alternative is the “new optional formal
consultation process.”311 It is optional in that EPA decides whether to initiate formal consultation by submitting a written request along with an “effects determination” to the Service.312 In conducting this consultation, the
Service may adopt EPA’s findings with respect to the ecological effects of
pesticides without issuing its own independent biological opinion.313
Despite these formal changes, it is unclear that the review of pesticides will be more or less protective of listed species and their habitats because in the past EPA “frequently failed” to consult with the Service with

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. A search of Westlaw’s ALLNEWS database and Lexis’ Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers
database yielded no mainstream articles on this regulation.
307. E.g., Juliet Eilperin, EPA Will Not Have to Consult Wildlife Agencies on Pesticides, WASH.
POST, July 30, 2004, at A07; John Heilprin, EPA Eases Rule Approving Pesticides, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 30, 2004, at 34. The Services receive more than 50,000 comments on the NFP rule, Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 F.R. 68,259, 68,257 (Dec. 8, 2003)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) but more than 125,000 on the pesticide rule, Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,732, 47,740 (Aug. 5, 2004)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
308. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg.
47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
309. Counterpart Regulations Governing Actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 50 C.F.R. § 402.45 (2004).
310. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg.
47,732, 47,740-57 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
311. Counterpart Regulations Governing Actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 50 C.F.R. § 402.46 (2004).
312. Id. § 402.46(a).
313. Id. § 402.46(c)(i).
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respect to new pesticides.314 The agencies completed only a dozen consultations in the last decade.315 The rationale for the failure to comply with the
Act was that the consultations would have been too complex.316 Rather than
comply with existing law, the Service justifies these regulations by stating
that the process needs to be streamlined, the Action Agencies have the requisite expertise, and the Service will maintain oversight.317 Despite EPA’s
expertise with respect to pesticides, critics challenge its expertise with respect to the Endangered Species Act. As an attorney for Earthjustice
quipped, “‘If you take the experts out of the room because you don’t like
what they’re saying, that’s one way to streamline the registration of dangerous pesticides’ . . . .”318 An attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
Council objected to the new regulation arguing that complexity counsels in
favor of more protection of listed species and their habitats, not less protection.319
The consultation process has played a crucial role in the regulation of
agency action. Section 7 is the “institutionalization” of caution.320 Traditionally, the Services have relied upon the action agencies to notify them
when an agency action might affect listed species and their habitats and to
notify them early in the process. Without informal consultation, the Services may be excluded from all but the major agency actions, and thus
these new regulations have the potential to vitiate the prophylactic benefits
of consultation. The regulations threaten to create a culture of willful ignorance. Though the Services may intervene and seek injunctive relief, they
would not be able to until later in the planning and implementation of the
agency actions upon somehow learning of likely adverse effects. Thus there
exists greater potential for adverse impacts to listed species and their habitats.
3. Cooperation
Secretary Norton is said to be emphasizing “cooperation at the local
level rather than federal edicts.”321 What this policy translates into is less
enforcement of federal law while “moving to impose regionally tailored
policies that give much more deference to local industry and local commu-

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Eilperin, supra note 311.
Eilperin, supra note 311; Heilprin, supra note 311.
Heilprin, supra note 311.
See id.
Eilperin, supra note 311.
Heilprin, supra note 311.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., at 4-5 (1973).
John Tiery, Trying for Balance at Interior Dept., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A26.
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nities.”322 As James Connaughton, chair of the CEQ, explained, “[w]hat
we’ve changed is this idea that Northeasterners who don’t really know the
West ought to be able to dictate how the West or the Midwest or anyplace
else can best achieve environmental improvements.”323 Mr. Connaughton
intimates that national environmental groups and cappuccino cowboys in
the northeast have too much control over national environmental policy.
However, laws are still passed by a representative body, i.e., Congress. The
agencies, to the contrary, are marching to the steady cadence of the White
House and perhaps are not giving due regard to those laws. Tailoring policies to meet regional needs has some common sense appeal; however, one
of the bedrock principles of federal environmental law is that at some level
there must be uniformity in order to accomplish the goals of environmental
law.324 Congress has established the minimum level of protection and has
not given the agencies the authority to change it.
In keeping with the spirit of cooperation, President Bush issued an executive order in August 2004 directing the Department of Interior, among
others, to “implement laws . . . in a manner that promotes cooperative conservation, with an emphasis on appropriate inclusion of local participation
in Federal decisionmaking.”325 Environmentalists have criticized the executive order as another attempt to deemphasize the role of the federal government in the management of public lands.326 The order also requires the
Department to act in a manner that “takes appropriate account of and respects the interests of persons with ownership or other legally recognized
interests in land and other natural resources.”327 This language concerns
environmentalists because it could lead the Department to privilege private
property rights over public property rights.328
And criticism of this cooperative approach comes from many different
groups. Some libertarians are concerned that Norton spends so much time
trying to cooperate with established interest groups such as environmentalists and miners that she is ignoring the free-markets principles with which
she was so enamored previously.329 Some environmentalists have ex322. Fagin, supra note 195.
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National Perspective) for Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POLY. F. 225, 251-91 (1997); Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600-05 (1996).
325. Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989, 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004).
326. Dan Berman, Bush Orders Departments to Encourage Cooperation with Communities, States,
GREENWIRE, Aug. 30, 2004.
327. Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989, 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004).
328. Berman, supra note 330.
329. Tierny, supra note 265.
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pressed skepticism about this approach as well, arguing that the agency is
actually only interested in cooperating with industry.
Hogwash, say prominent conservationists. “This isn’t about empowering
local communities, it’s about serving the Republicans’ core backers: the
extractive industries and big manufacturers,” said Carl Pope, the longtime executive director of the 700,000-member Sierra Club. “Bush campaigned as a populist but he’s governing as a Whig. These guys think the
330
sole proper function is to serve business.”

When confronted with such criticism, Norton points to the cooperative projects that the Department sponsors.331 For example, the Cooperative Conservation Initiative is comprised of many programs, including the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, the Landowner Incentive
program, the Partners for Fish and Wildlife program, and the Private Stewardship program.332 The Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation
Fund provides funding under section 6 of the Act for states and territories
to engage in species protection on non-federal land.333 In order to qualify
for a grant under this program, the state or territory must enter into a “cooperative agreement” with the Service.334 For fiscal year 2002-03, the Service had approximately $80 million available for such grants.335 The Partners for Fish and Wildlife program offers technical and financial assistance
to private landowners who would like to restore wildlife habitat on their
property.336 The Private Stewardship Program, with almost $10 million in
funding for fiscal year 2002-03, provides grants to private entities involved
in voluntary measures to protect listed, proposed, or candidate species.337

330. Fagin, supra note 195.
331. Tierny, supra note 265.
332. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 332. Four grants are available through this fund. The
majority of the funds, $63.8 million or almost 79%, is designated for acquisition of land, with $51.1
million for the fiscal year 2002-03 designated for HCP Land Acquisition Grants, which states and territories may use to purchase land associated with approved HCPs and $12.7 million for the Recovery
Land Acquisition Grants, which they may use to purchase land in support of approved recovery plans
for endangered or threatened species. States and territories may use the Conservation Grants, $7.5 million to help conserve listed and at-risk species and the Habitat Conservation Planning Assistance
Grants, $6.6 million, to develop HCPs. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Partnerships With States:
Tools for Helping Communities and Landowners Conserve Species Habitat, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/grants.pdf (March 2003).
336. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program—Our Partners, Goals
and Accomplishments, at http://partners.fws.gov/old/What%20we%20do/overview.html (June 24,
2002). Between 1987 and 2002, 27,000 landowners participated in this program. Scarlett, supra note
235, at 75.
337. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10.
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a. Cooperation as Compensation
Many members of Congress have tried unsuccessfully—session after
session—to pass legislation to provide compensation for private landowners whose development activities have been curtailed by operation of the
Endangered Species Act. The stories of small landowners losing the ability
to develop their land, however, lost considerable force as then Secretary
Bruce Babbitt worked to make the Act more “flexible.” Under Babbitt, the
Service increased its use of section 10, creating boilerplate HCPs for small
landowners.338 The Service also developed the “No Surprises” policy to
give assurances that once the Service issued an incidental take permit under
section 10, very little, if anything, more would be required of the permittee
even if circumstances regarding the listed species changed or later became
known.339 Babbitt’s actions diffused the situation created by the private
property rights activists and dissipated the political will to overhaul the
Act.340 Though his actions were well-intentioned and likely meant to save
the Act from what appeared to be its imminent demise, Part VII.B.1.b. of
this Article critiques the “No Surprises” policy as successful in achieving
its primary goal (calming the legislative rancor) but nonetheless misguided.
Despite elimination of some of the most compelling arguments for
compensation, the reformists still desired to compensate private landowners. Although unable to amend the ESA directly, the reformers have been
able to increase appropriations for certain aspects of the implementation of
the Act. Raising the level of funding to the Service would seem neutral to
positive for species protection, but the use of that funding in some programs rather than others may ignore the will of the public not to compensate private landowners regardless of the size of their holdings.
With Secretary Norton’s programs and the help of Congress’ appropriations, the Service is accomplishing now what Congress could not do on
its own. The argument is that the most effective means for protecting listed
species on private land is to provide landowners with financial incentives
rather than penalties. In essence, the Service is choosing to pay landowners
to comply with existing law. The Service is using existing mechanisms to
administer these grants and some environmental interest groups have em-

338. See Eric Pryne, A Tale of Two Tree Farmers-Specter of Law Causes One Man to Log Early,
While Other Struggles to Conserve Habitat, SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 1995, at A1. See also Patrick A.
Parenteau, Who’s Taking What? Property Rights, Endangered Species, and the Constitution, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 619, 623 (1995).
339. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5) (2003). See also Patrick A. Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs:
Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY.
REV. 227, 291-92 (1998).
340. Leshy, supra note 64, at 213-14.
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braced these types of programs.341 At the same time, however, the Service
is not requesting adequate funding to carry out its primary functions under
the Act.
b. Cooperation as Capture
Norton says that the 4 C’s apply to relationships “[b]etween landowners and environmentalists; between all levels of government and federal officials; between government leaders and the media; and between all the
people of goodwill who share the common goal of protecting our wild
places and the habitat[s] that surround them.”342 Yet, there is much debate
concerning the wisdom of these collaborative efforts.343 The criticism that
EPA faced several years ago could apply with equal force to Norton’s approach. EPA began to engage more frequently in negotiated rulemaking344
and to develop programs similar to the Common Sense Initiative345 and
Project XL.346 Critics of these programs suggest that these approaches lead
to under-representation of certain groups, which then leads to decisions that
reflect the desires of the most powerful and well-connected among the
stakeholders.347 Thus true consensus may never be reached.
Moreover, consensus can also hamstring efforts toward real solutions.
As one commentator discussed with respect to water disputes in the West—
[W]e abdicate our ability to make something happen whenever an outspoken, insistent minority does not want it. Another pernicious result is
that we waste tons of money on solutions everyone can buy into but
achieve little. Consensus-seeking makes us all feel good. But, in Margaret Thatcher’s apt phrase, it is another term for lack of leadership; it

341. See generally Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 692 (1999) (discussing the evolving role of non-profit organizations in partnership agreements between private entities and governments).
342. Norton, supra note 269.
343. Compare Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy: GovernmentBusiness Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10891 (2001) with Michael
McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 (May 13, 1996).
344. For a general discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of negotiated rulemakings, see Richard
B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
345. 59 Fed. Reg. 57,178 (Nov. 14, 1994) (proposing plan for EPA to work with outside groups to
find less expensive means to produce a cleaner environment).
346. See e.g., Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making it Legal, Making it Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL
L.J. 399 (1998) (describing Project XL and the barriers to its success).
347. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 343; see also Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of
Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 74 (2000)
(proposing something short of the collaborative governance model).
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means you must accept minority tyranny over majority will whenever an
348
implacable few have gummed the works.

Furthermore, these collaborative efforts may provide an opportunity for
“collusion” or some heightened version of “agency capture.”349 Collusion
will occur because agencies may be tempted to strike bargains with repeat
players without giving proper attention to the larger public interest. Also,
negotiations naturally will tend to favor the more powerful groups. These
repeat players will also take on the mantle of authority and may not adequately disclose their “rational self-interest.” Often, the most powerful
group will be industry and if its positions prevail, it can be argued that environmental standards inevitably will be weakened. While such dangers
may already exist, the potential for problems will only increase as agencies
steer in the direction of a more collaborative model of rulemaking.
In addition, a greater degree of subdelegation can be expected as a result of this move toward collaboration. Subdelegation occurs when an
agency delegates some of its statutory responsibilities to another entity.350
The agencies are not only shouldering more responsibility with respect to
lawmaking, but they are now faced with the limiting legislation that was
enacted in fulfillment of the Contract with America. For example, legislation such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995351 placed greater
analytic demands on agencies requiring more extensive cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment, as well as adding the burden of reporting to various
administrative arms of Congress. At the same time, the White House continues to heap new requirements on the agencies. And because of the limbo
that the Act has been in since its last authorization, the agencies have not
been provided with adequate resources to implement these demands. Accordingly, agencies can be expected to welcome the opportunity to reallocate regulatory responsibility to private entities, a delegation of power that
was not authorized by Congress or the voters.
Norton, however, cannot be credited or blamed for initiating this approach to the enforcement of natural resources law. Former Secretary
Bruce Babbitt was also interested in pursuing alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. Babbitt described what he and his agency were doing as “an

348. Marc Reisner, The New Water Agenda: Restoration, Deconstruction, and the Limits to Consensus, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (2000).
349. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
83-87 (1997).
350. See generally Allyson Barker, et al., The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land Resource Management: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67 (2003) (discussing
subdelegation doctrine).
351. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (2000).
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entirely extralegal process in which stakeholders are convened.”352 Babbitt
admitted that this “extralegal, extra-constitutional body” may not be what it
ought to be, but he thought it was the only mechanism working in the country at the time.353
VII. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S INITIATIVES
The role of the Executive Branch has shifted noticeably with respect
to the Endangered Species Act since the Contract with America. While neither Congress nor the courts have advanced significantly the positions of
various stakeholders, the Department of Interior and the White House have
been working diligently to do so.354 As Former Secretary Bruce Babbitt explained, “[w]hat we’re doing is effectively what Congress used to do. We
are resolving disputes, creating administrative law, legislating and appropriating. Now how do we do that outside the normal circle of our institutions?”355 In essence, the Department of Interior was exceeding the scope
of its authority under the Act and the U.S. Constitution. This trend continues with the Bush Administration.
Business leaders are pleased with the direction the administration is
moving with respect to agency action. For example, the vice president for
environmental policy of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce explained, “‘I’m
very optimistic’ . . . . ‘I think we’re going to see a lot of changes that are
friendly to business, and a lot of that is going to happen in the agencies.
They’re going to make a lot of headway.’”356 Unfortunately, that headway
likely will be made “outside the limelight,”357 and yet these changes are terribly disquieting. As a review of the Bush Administration’s track record
with regard to wilderness and wildlife points out,
the Bush Administration’s approach . . . has generally not involved the
outright declaration of anti-conservation policy objectives. Instead, the

352. Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Decisions Are Made, in
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR, 13, 14
(CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation), Vol. 19, No. 1,
Jan. 2001 [hereinafter Babbitt, ADR Concepts]; see also Bruce Babbitt, Remarks to the Society of Range
Management, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 399, 401 (1994) (“These new groups bring together ranchers,
environmentalists and interested citizens to meet over coffee at the kitchen table and out on the range to
listen to each other to develop mutual confidence and to search for consensus in solving public land
issues.”).
353. Babbitt, ADR Concepts, supra note 352, at 15.
354. See id. at 14 (discussing congressional abdication and the failures of courts).
355. Id. at 14-15.
356. Fagin, supra note 195.
357. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Nature of the Beast: An Introduction to the Issue, 33 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 333, 336-37 (2003) (describing how George W. Bush’s Administration has “quietly” backed
away from the Clinton Administration’s direction).
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administration’s public pronouncements have continued to stress the importance of protecting wilderness areas and endangered species. Notwithstanding these pronouncements, however, significant changes appear
to be afoot. Through the settling of industry-initiated lawsuits against
federal agencies, unannounced shifts in internal agency policy, and discretionary inaction on proposals inherited from the Clinton Administration, President George W. Bush has quietly set a new course for wilder358
ness and wildlife policy.

That course has been set in part by encouraging agencies to develop “a
smarter regulatory process based on sound science and economics: a
smarter process adopts new rules when market and local choices fail, modifies existing rules to make them more effective or less costly and rescinds
outmoded rules whose benefits no longer justify their costs.”359 From the
economics standpoint, the administration is expanding upon an Executive
Order issued by former President Bill Clinton.360 Under this order, an
agency must assess the costs and benefits of proposed regulation and only
propose the regulation if its benefits justify the costs.361 If an agency proposes “significant regulatory action,” it must provide OMB with additional
information regarding the costs and benefits expected from the regulatory
action and the costs and benefits of any feasible alternatives.362 In 2003
OMB provided guidance to the agencies on how to develop the required
“regulatory analysis,” with the bulk of it being cost-benefit analysis.363
The administration has also issued the rallying cry for the use of
“sound science” in regulatory decisionmaking. “Ours is going to be an administration that makes decisions on science, what’s realistic, commonsense decisions.”364 This approach intentionally and unintentionally can

358. Id.
359. Graham, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
360. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (seeking
to “reform and make more efficient the regulatory process”).
361. Id. (“Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation
and . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”).
362. Id.
363. OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, Sept. 17, 2003 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter OMB Circular A-4]. In the event that agencies do not follow this
guidance, OMB is using what is known as the “dreaded return letter” and other forms of persuasion.
Graham, supra note 2. The return letter is one that OMB may use to “return” a proposed rule to an
agency for reconsideration if OMB makes any number of determinations, including that the quality of
the agency’s analysis is unacceptable or the standards adopted are not supported by the analysis. John
D. Graham, Memorandum for the President’s Management Council re Presidential Review of Agency
Rulemaking by OIRA, at 6 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-38-attach.pdf. (Sept. 20,
2001) (emphasis added).
364. Press Release, White House, Press Conference by the President (Mar. 29, 2001) at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html.
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lead to intolerable delays or even “analysis paralysis” wherein the agency
undertakes to study and restudy issues such that no action is ever taken.
Thus, this call for sound science may be little more than an elaborate, expensive delay tactic.
Also “White House officials say ‘sound science’ fits with Bush’s market-based approach to environmental protection. The administration says
it’s possible to balance the need for biodiversity, clean air and clean water
with economic growth, energy production and reduced regulation.”365 One
market-based approach is the development of conservation banks for critical habitat.366 Another is the development of the “No Surprises” policy to
provide an incentive for private landowners to protect listed species on
their land. This policy, however, is in effect deregulation, exceeding the
scope of the Department of Interior’s statutory authority. This part of the
Article will explore the implications of these policies for species protection.
A. The Problem with the ESA and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Quantifying the costs of compliance with existing law seems to be a
practical idea. The costs of habitat conservation plans, mitigation measures,
loss of intended economic use of land, etc., seem readily quantifiable. Indeed, at first glance, such a requirement would appear to be a good, “common sense” policy to implement. But an examination of the goals and provisions of the ESA call this common sense approach into question because
one then must turn to the valuation of threatened and endangered species,
critical habitat, and biodiversity. There’s the rub. Here policy-makers encounter the difficulty, the impossibility, or the folly of quantifying in dollars the value of biodiversity.
Some commentators suggest that environmentalists have evaded questions of efficiency and cost-benefit analyses,367 but environmentalists respond that cost-benefit analysis ignores “important ‘noneconomic’ values
or that economic analyses are inadequate means to evaluate decisions af-

365. Julie Deardorff, The Politics of Nature; Bush Has Said his Environmental Strategies Won’t
Harm Nature or Man—A Claim Some Doubt, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2003, at C1.
366. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation
Banks 2-19 (May 2, 2003) at http://endangered.fws.gov/policies/conservation-banking.pdf. The Department of Interior released guidance without a notice and comment period. Interior Department Issues First Guidance on Conservation Banks for Habitat Protection, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES
(BNA), No. 103, at A-26 (May 29, 2003).
367. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY 28-45 (1987); David
Ehrenfeld, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?, in BIODIVERSITY 212, 214-15 (E.O. Wilson ed. 1988)
(“The sad fact that few conservationists care to face is that many species, perhaps most, do not seem to
have any conventional value at all, even hidden conventional value.”).
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fecting the environment.”368 And in the attempted “translation” of these
values into dollar values, we lose what is most important to us about the
environment.369 Moreover, Federico Cheever argues that it is unwise to
weigh the value of endangered listed species against the cost of their protection. “Once a species is perched on the brink of extinction, compromise
becomes unacceptably dangerous; what may look like ‘reasonable’ accommodation may lead to annihilation.”370
Putting aside these criticisms of applying this analytic framework to
decisions about endangered species, more difficulties remain. One such difficulty with quantification stems in part from the reasons for preserving
biodiversity. There are a number of conceptual frameworks in this area that
include distinguishing between anthropocentric and biocentric rationales,371
demand values and transformative values,372 and utilitarian, esthetic, and
ethical bases for preservation.373 Many of these reasons hinge upon speculative calculations about what discoveries will or could be made in the future which make quantification difficult.374
Despite these limitations, many attempts have been made to quantify
the value of preservation. The first and most obvious route for cost-benefit
analysis is to attempt to assign some market value to the species. Yet many
would argue that because no market exists for many species, cost-benefit
analysis is not a rational decision-making tool.375 However, economists
have made attempts to hypothesize a market for these species “by determining what the individual would be willing to pay . . . for an increment
of . . . [the good] or what compensation the individual would be willing to

368. BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 340, at 28.
369. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 39-40 (2004).
370. Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedges, Lilies, CheckerMallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endangered Species
Act is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 315 (1998).
371. See, e.g., PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE 44-53 (1986); TIMOTHY BEATLEY,
ETHICAL LAND USE: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND PLANNING 6-9 (1994) (describing rationales as ranging from utilitarian and instrumental views to those that focus upon the intrinsic or inherent value of
other species).
372. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 367, at 6-14 (describing values we place on things
we demand now versus values to be gained in the future because the existence of the thing and the experience of the thing transform us).
373. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 269-75 (1991).
374. Congressional debates have touched upon this quandary in citing the example of the discovery
of the medicinal value of the yew tree. 141 CONG. REC. S3576 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Boxer).
375. Cf. BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 367, at 28.
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accept as compensation for the decrement of it.”376 A number of criticisms
have been launched against the use of this hypothetical or contingent valuation, however.377 First, people’s expressed preferences, that is what they
say they would do, often contradict their revealed preferences, what they
have done.378 Also, the answers to questions about one’s willingness to pay
or willingness to accept compensation vary with the structure of the survey.379 For example, the order of questions and reminders of budgetary
constraints often change the responses.380 Furthermore, the amount people
are willing to pay for preservation or to accept as compensation for degradation does not move in a step-wise progression. Greater gains or losses are
not matched by equal changes in amount of money to be paid or accepted.381
Admittedly, OMB’s guidance to the agencies does acknowledge that
some values may not be expressed in terms of monetary or physical units
and that attempting to use cost-benefit analysis in those instances is “less
useful” and “can even be misleading.”382 But more troubling is the ability
of this requirement “to reorder agency priorities or to stall or foreclose
some protective rulemakings,”383 despite recognition of its limitations. This
policy objective mimics one important aspect of the various amendments
proposed by Congress that would require agencies to engage in “takings
impact analysis.”384 That proposed legislation would have required the U.S.
Attorney General to certify that agency actions were in compliance with
376. Id. See also BEATLEY, supra note 371, at 50-52 (1994) (sampling various contingent valuation
techniques).
377. See generally CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed.,
1993).
378. Peter Passell, Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price Tag on Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 1993, at A1.
379. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 883 (1994) (“The bulk of the economic debate regarding . . . [contingent valuations] has focused on the sensitivity of the results—or the
lack thereof—to factors like the framing of questions, the means of conducting the survey . . . .”);
ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS:
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 214-16 (1989) (discussing the affect of the survey instrument
on reliability).
380. Passell, supra note 378.
381. See id. (citing a study which showed that the public was willing to spend the same amount to
save 2,000; 20,000; and 200,000 migratory birds from oil-covered ponds).
382. OMB Circular A-4, supra note 363.
383. Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 123 (2003).
384. E.g., Private Property Rights Act of 2001, S. 1412, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); Private Property
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 212, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); Private Property Rights Act of 1999, S. 246,
106th Cong § 5 (1999); Ominbus Property Rights Act of 1997, S. 781 105th Cong. § 403 (1997);
Ominbus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 403 (1995).
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Executive Order 12,630 or similar procedures to assess the potential for
taking private property.385 Executive Order 12,630 required every agency to
“identify the takings implications of proposed regulatory actions and address the merits of those actions in light of the identified takings implications.”386 Supporters of such proposals believed that it would force bureaucrats to address the government’s obligations under the Fifth Amendment
rather than ignore them.387 On the other hand, these proposals were thought
merely to have added another layer of bureaucracy to decision-making.388
And self-interested parties could use them to delay governmental action
that is considered to be desirable for the country.389 Indeed, rather than
making government officials analyze the impact of their actions, the proposed legislation perhaps was an attempt to frighten those officials away
from performing their statutory obligations.390 As John Graham explains,
OMB is “using both the carrot and the stick” so that “agencies are beginning to invite OMB into the early stages of regulatory deliberations, where
our analytical approach can have a much bigger impact.”391 And when invited in, this administration has the opportunity to use the policy pronouncement to excuse itself from implementing the Act as intended by
Congress. Below is a discussion of how the Executive Branch may use
cost-benefit analysis to abdicate its responsibilities under the Act for listings and designations of critical habitat.
1. Listing Species
Environmental law is one of the few areas in which consideration of
cost often is strictly prohibited.392 For example, with respect to listing decisions, the ESA requires the Secretary to make those decisions “solely on
385. Private Property Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 212, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001).
386. Exec. Order 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
387. Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 543
(Spr. 2000).
388. Id.
389. Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 78-79
(1996).
390. Compare Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187, 195
(2000) (“Even there, however, the constitutional claim is more likely to be a threat used to intimidate
the other side in negotiations.”), and Glenn P. Sugamel, “Takings” Bills Threaten People, Property,
Zoning, and the Environment, 31 URB. LAW. 177, 193 (Spr. 1999) (arguing that property rights bills
would allow developers to intimidate municipalities into approving inappropriate projects), with Daniel
Pollak, Have the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5th Amendment Takings Decisions Changed Land Use Planning
in California (California Research Bureau, California State Library), Mar. 2000, at 77-81 (reporting that
while most municipalities surveyed did not make major changes in their regulation of land use, a significant minority did report that they have changed their strategies).
391. Graham, supra note 2.
392. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
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the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to
him . . . .”393 The plain language of this provision appears to bar absolutely
consideration of the economic impacts of listing decisions, and thus concern about the use of cost-benefit analysis may be misplaced. Yet, when
one carefully examines the implementation of the Act as Oliver Houck has
done, the provision’s language is no longer plain.394 In the context of what
Houck describes as “exploitation of some very limited flexibility Congress
provided for listing, and chronic resistance to the Act itself,”395 the Department of Interior has made this and other provisions of the Act more
discretionary than mandatory.396
This discretion coupled with the cry for more cost-benefit analysis allows the Service to slow down the listing process, and during this slowdown more species become extinct. Given the statute’s language, it is
unlikely that the Service will cite cost-benefit analysis as a reason for denying a petition to list a species or for refusing to take the initiative itself. But
the force of this rhetoric could serve as a significant unspoken rationale of
its decisions not to list, and as such may do violence to the “environmental
ethics”397 underlying the statute.
Consider the example of the northern spotted owl. Environmental
groups sued the Department of Interior for its failure to list the northern
spotted owl as threatened or endangered in the face of biological evidence
of its endangerment.398 The listing decision may not have been problematic
for the Secretary absent the requirements of section 4(a)(3). Section 4(a)(3)
requires that the Secretary upon listing “to the extent prudent and determinable . . . designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to
be critical habitat.”399 Only at this point, may the Secretary explicitly consider the economic impact of her decisions. But with the need for economic
analysis overshadowing implementation of the Act, the Secretary may be
hesitant to carry out her obligations with respect to one portion of the Act
because she does not wish to set into motion the seemingly nondiscretionary processes described below. The reformers worry that the Secretary does not consider the socioeconomic impact of her determinations
393. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
394. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993).
395. Id. at 285.
396. See id. at 297 (stating that the Endangered Species Act permitting system is conducted
“largely at the Department’s discretion”).
397. See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 65
n.5 (2003) (defining “environmental ethics”).
398. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
399. 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
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thus setting the stage for inevitable political “train wrecks;”400 the conservationists argue that the Secretary impermissibly takes into account the socioeconomic impact of future determinations and thus lists an artificially
low number of species to avoid political “train wrecks.”401
2. Designating Critical Habitat
As soon as the Secretary makes the initial decision to list a species,
without factoring in economics, she appears to be required statutorily to
take a number of non-discretionary actions. One of those is that the Secretary is to concurrently with making the decision to list a species, to the extent prudent and determinable, also designate critical habitat.402 Yet as
Houck explains, in many instances the Department has “simply refused to
designate critical habitat at all.”403
In describing the Interior’s reluctance and/or refusal to designate and
protect critical habitat during Bruce Babbitt’s tenure, lawyers from the
EarthJustice Legal Fund argued that “[t]his action—or inaction—by the
Department [of Interior] is a deliberate subversion of public process by an
agency that has made a conscious decision not to enforce a law that the vast
majority of the American public supports.”404 This behavior has apparently
continued with Secretary Gale Norton. The administration has been described as entering into “behind-the-scenes settlements with industry litigants that are challenging critical habitat designations.”405 The settlements

400. Former U.S. Department of Interior Secretary Bruce E. Babbitt repeatedly used the term “train
wrecks” to describe the conflicts between landowners and the ESA. See, e.g., Marla Cone, Protection
for Owl Challenged, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at A3 (“‘economic train wrecks’ that occur when the
federal government steps in with the Endangered Species Act to save species headed toward extinction”).
401. See Wiygul & Weiner, supra note 197, at 13 (“Put simply, DOI has bowed to political pressure from property rights groups and corporate developers.”).
402. 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
403. Houck, supra note 394, at 297.
404. Wiygul & Weiner, supra note 197, at 13. See also Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical
Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2000) (noting that as of 1999 critical habitat had been designated for only ten
percent of the listed species); Houck, supra note 394, at 302 (1993) (noting that as of 1992, critical
habitat had been designated for only sixteen percent of the listed species). As of June 2003 it was
estimated that the Service had designated critical habitat for approximately one-third of the listed
species. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED
FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS 6, 8 (Aug. 2003) (stating that 1,263 species were listed as
endangered and that, of those, 417 had critical habitat designated) at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03803.pdf.
405. Michael Senatore et al., Critical Habitat at the Crossroads: Responding to the G. W. Bush
Administration’s Attacks on Critical Habitat Designation Under the ESA, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
447, 448 (2003).
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typically involve a remand of the designation to allow for extensive economic impact analysis while no critical habitat is protected.406
Another way to assure that few designations are made is to include the
cost of listing the species in the economic impact analysis for the designation of critical habitat for that species. Before New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,407 the Department of Interior
used an “incremental baseline approach.” Under such an approach, the
costs from listing the species were ignored because the decision to list a
species must be made solely on the basis of the best available scientific and
commercial data. In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the industry challengers
argued, however, that Congress intended for all costs, including those associated with listing, to be included in the economic impact analysis for designations of critical habitat.408 The Service responded that if it were required to abandon this approach, it would improperly consider economic
impacts in its listing decisions.409 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, agreed with the industry challengers and rejected the baseline approach.
The Service did not appeal the ruling. Then, “[w]ithout soliciting public comment or waiting for the judgment of any other Circuit Court, and
without revisiting its controversial assertions about the redundancy of critical habitat, the Bush Administration has quietly adopted the New Mexico
Cattle Growers holding as administration policy”410 for all Circuits.411 Indeed, Secretary Norton and industry plaintiffs urged the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia to adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach.412 The
district court declined that invitation but vacated the Service’s use of the
baseline approach in two final rules designating critical habitat and ordered
it to revise the rules by July 30, 2004.413 If the Service is correct that aban-

406. Id. at 448, 463-66, 465 n.103.
407. 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (industry challenge of Service’s economic analysis of designating critical habitat for the southwest willow flycatcher).
408. Id. at 1280 (“baseline approach to measuring economic impact . . . is an erroneous construction, and thus, a violation of the ESA”).
409. Id. at 1285.
410. Endangered Species Act Before the Comm. on Senate Environment and Public Works, Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John Kostyack, Senior
Counsel, National Wildlife Federation), available at 2003 WL 11717440 [hereinafter Kostyack].
411. Home Builders Associations of Northern California v. Norton, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.
2002).
412. Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 100, 102 (D.D.C.
2002).
413. Id. at 105, 108-09. The Department states that it will propose critical habitat for these species
on April 1, 2004. Unified Agenda, Proposed Rule Stage, 68 Fed. Reg. 73,091-01 (Dec. 22, 2003). Be-
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doning the baseline approach will inject inappropriately economic impacts
into the listing of new species, there is every expectation that listing new
species will become increasingly difficult.414
B. Sound Science
The Executive Branch is also at least rhetorically endorsing the use of
“sound science,” with peer review as its centerpiece.415 Pursuant to the Information Quality Act,416 an appropriations rider, OMB directed agencies
to (1) “[i]ssue their own information quality guidelines” for the information
they disseminate, (2) establish administrative procedures to allow the public to challenge the correctness of information that the agencies disseminate, and (3) report periodically to OMB on the complaints the agencies receive about the accuracy of their information.417 Citing the Information
Quality Act as its statutory authority, OMB recently proposed guidance for
agencies to engage in a peer-review process,418 because “[a] more uniform
peer review policy promises to make regulatory science more competent
and credible, thereby advancing the administration’s ‘smart regulation’
agenda.”419
This appropriations rider and the ensuing executive actions replay a
theme of the Contract with America420 and bills that have been introduced

cause the court vacated the baseline approach, the Service will in effect have to develop another methodology for economic impact analysis by the end of July 2004 as well.
414. Kostyack, supra note 410.
415. But see Jennifer 8. Lee, The President’s Budget Proposal: The Outlays—Environment; Research Budget is Lowered Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at A16 (noting that the budget for the
agency’s competitive grants program, which pays for studies outside the agency, had been cut by about
a third from previous levels).
416. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2000).
417. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458 (Feb. 22, 2002). The
Department of Interior’s guidelines became effective on October 1, 2003. U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Information Quality Guidelines 2, at http://irm.fws.gov/infoguidelines/FWS%20Information
%20Quality%20Guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
418. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15,
2003); Politics, Science Like Oil, Water, ATLANTA J. CONST. Jan 20, 2004, at 10A.
419. Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Proposes Draft Peer Review Standards for Regulatory Science (Aug. 29, 2003) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/200334.pdf.
420. E.g., Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 637 (1995) (requiring agencies to develop program for independent, external peer review); Endangered Species Fair
Regulatory Process Reform Act, H.R. 4556, 105th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (1998) (requiring independent peer
review, issuance of rules to establish criteria to be met for the data, inclusion of species field observation studies in the data, and “substantial evidence” for the listing process).
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in the years following it.421 For example, in the Sound Science Saves Species Act of 2002, Congress proposed that in order to designate critical habitat, the Service would be required to “give greater weight to scientific or
commercial data that is empirical or has been field-tested or peerreviewed.”422 Another proposal would have required all listing decisions to
be supported by “clear and convincing evidence,”423 and such decisions
would have to be reviewed by an independent board to determine the “sufficiency of all relevant scientific information and assumptions.”424
This emphasis on the use of sound science implies that one of the major problems with the Endangered Species Act is that the Fish and Wildlife
Service is making decisions based upon unreliable or untested information.
The Act requires the Secretary to make her decisions based on “the best
scientific and commercial data available.”425 Though the statute does not
provide much guidance on this criteria, in 1994 the Fish and Wildlife Service along with the National Marine Fisheries Service and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration adopted a policy to use a wide
variety of sources of information, including informal sources such as oral,
traditional, or anecdotal, as well as more formal sources such as peerreviewed scientific studies.426 The Service committed itself to evaluating
the information impartially and ensuring that any information used to implement the ESA would be reliable and credible in addition to representing
“the best scientific and commercial data available.”427 The Service adopted
another joint policy to incorporate independent peer review.428
Though the Service has taken these affirmative steps to ensure that it
bases its decisions upon reliable and credible scientific information, the
perception has arisen in Congress and the administration that the Service is
using “unsound” science to make its determinations. There is scant evi-

421. E.g., Sound Science For Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th
Cong. (2002).
422. Scientifically Identifying the Need for Critical Habitat Act, H.R. 2602, 108th Cong. § 3(a)
(2003); see also Sound Science for Endangered Species Decisionmaking Act of 2002, S. 1912, 107th
Cong. (2002); Endangered Species Fair Regulatory Process Reform Act, H.R. 4556, 105th Cong. § 2
(1998).
423. Sound Science Saves Species Act of 2002, H.R. 3705, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2002).
424. Id. § 3(c).
425. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), 1536(c)(1) (2000).
426. Notice of Interagency Cooperation Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994).
427. Id.
428. Notice of Interagency Cooperation Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
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dence, however, that this perception bears any relation to reality.429 In fact a
1999 study of the use of science in habitat conservation plans found that the
Service was making good use of the available data.430 Instead, as Kathleen
McGinty, former chair of CEQ, “denounced the reform efforts [of the 104th
Congress] as hiding a destructive deregulatory agenda beneath rhetoric
about sound science,”431 arguably, the same could be said of the current
administration’s efforts.
1. Subversive Mechanisms
Some would argue that through the proposed guidance on peer review,
OMB is trying hijack the process from the agencies432 to advance a subversive, deregulatory agenda. Outlined below are some of the guidance’s key
provisions to that end. For example, under the proposal, each agency would
be required to submit a report to OMB at least once a year with a summary
of “existing, ongoing, or contemplated scientific or technical studies that
might (in whole or in part) constitute or support significant regulatory information the agency intends to disseminate.”433 OMB may require “formal, independent, external peer review” of any agency information that it
selects,434 and if requested, the agency must discuss with OMB a specific
document and whether the planned review of that document is sufficient.435
The proposal also discourages the use of academic experts who have received grants from agencies but does not issue similar warning against using experts with connections to regulated industries.436 Additionally, agen429. Cf. Wagner, supra note 383 (examining three sound science reforms and finding that none of
them “are supported by meaningful evidence that the purported problem—’bad science’, or more precisely, science that is methodologically unsound—occurs with any regularity in administrative decisionmaking”).
430. Peter Kareiva, et al., Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans 4, at
http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/projects/97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf (last visited on Feb. 28,
2004). The study noted that the Service did not have the resources to obtain the necessary data. Id. The
study urged the Service to err on the side of caution and not approve habitat conservation plans when
data is scarce, though it acknowledged that the statute does not require the Secretary to obtain more data
but to base her decision on the best available data. Id. at 45-46. Thus, the study seemed to question the
quantity not the quality of the science used in the decisionmaking process.
431. Ronald Begley, Deregulatory Moves in Congress Meet Resistance from Administration,
CHEM. WK., Feb. 22, 1995, 1995 WL 10012152.
432. Politics, Science Like Oil, Water, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 20, 2004, at A10.
433. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,029
(Sept. 15, 2003).
434. Id. at 54,027.
435. Id. at 54,028.
436. Rick Weiss, Peer Review Plan Draws Criticism Under Bush Proposal: OMB Would Evaluate
Science Before New Rules Take Effect, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at A19. See Proposed Bulletin on
Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,025, 54,027 (Sept. 15, 2003); See also
Letter from Linda Greer, Director, Health and Environment Program, Natural Resources Defense
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cies must provide OMB with a copy of any request from the public for correction of information within seven days of receipt.437 Further, upon
OMB’s request, an agency must provide a copy of its draft response at least
seven days before issuing it, and OMB must approve the response before
issuance.438
One motivation for wresting control of the peer review process is that
according to a report prepared for Representative Henry A. Waxman, the
administration is skewing science on a number of issues, many of which
have significant economic impact for President Bush’s large corporate donors.439 The report argues that the administration has used three basic
strategies: (1) manipulating the composition of scientific advisory committees, (2) suppressing or distorting scientific information, and (3) interfering
with scientific research.440 Similarly, a report prepared by the Democratic
staff of the House Committee on Resources accuses the Department of Interior of manipulating scientific information for political purposes.441 Because Interior often appears to ignore the expert advice of its own scientists, the report dubs the administration’s scientific approach to regulation
“weird science.”442 One climate policy expert observed, “[p]olitical staff
are becoming increasingly bold in forcing agency officials to endorse junk
science.”443 More than sixty prominent scientists, including twenty Nobel
Laureates, signed a statement criticizing the Bush Administration for its
misuse of science.444 Below are some specific examples of how the adminiCouncil to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Management and Budget 2-5 (Dec. 11, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/72.pdf (arguing that if scientists who receive government funding are eliminated as possible peer reviewers, the result would be the use of scientists whose
research is funded by the regulated industries); Letter from Winston H. Hickox, Agency Secretary, California Environmental Protection Agency, to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Management and Budget 2,
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/64.pdf (Oct. 28, 2003) (citing need to address potential for economic conflicts of interest beyond that of reviewers who have worked with an agency or received a grant from an agency).
437. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,029
(Sept. 15, 2003).
438. Id.
439. MINORITY STAFF OF COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 2 at http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_
science_rep.pdf (Nov. 13, 2003) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
440. Id. at 2-3.
441. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF COMM. ON RESOURCES, WEIRD SCIENCE: THE INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT’S MANIPULATION OF SCIENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES at http://www.ourforests.org/
weirdscience.pdf (Dec. 17, 2002) (Rep. Nick J. Rahall).
442. Id. at 1.
443. Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye, Report by the E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A1.
444. RSI [Restoring Scientific Integrity] Signatories at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/
rsi/page.cfm?pageID=1335 (last revised Apr. 16, 2004).
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stration’s use of science (sound, weird, junk or otherwise) has impacted
species protection negatively.
2. Pernicious Results
Many believe that OMB’s proposal is designed “to inject White House
politics into the world of science and to use the uncertainty that surrounds
science to delay new rules that could cost regulated industries millions of
dollars.”445 Indeed, the promotion of “sound science” has provided the
Bush Administration’s basis for delaying several new regulations,446 yet the
absence of science has not prevented the administration from dismantling
current regulations.447 On the side of increasing or even maintaining environmental protections, this strategy is important, for as Oliver Houck points
out, “to decision-makers who require irrefutable proof, the uncertainty is
fatal.”448 According to Houck, what President Bush means by using sound

445. Weiss, supra note 436; see also Greer, supra note 414, at 6 (proposal “will magnify the excessive delays that already plague the rulemaking process”); Hickox, supra note 409, at 1, 3 (commenting
that proposed guidelines would burden the agencies and delay the release of information needed for
science-based regulation).
446. See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, Scientists Frustrated with Administration, HOUS. CHRON., July 24,
2003, at 5A. In March 2001, the Bush Administration withdrew the new arsenic standards established in
the waning days of the Clinton Administration. Eric Pianin & Cindy Skrzycki, EPA to Kill New Arsenic
Standards; Whitman Cites Debate On Drinking Water Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at A1. In
April 2001, EPA announced that a new rule would be released in eleven months, after a study by the
National Academy of Sciences. Mike Allen, EPA to Lower Level for Arsenic in Water, WASH. POST,
Apr. 19, 2001, at A8. EPA then reinstated the rule seven months later after the study showed an even
greater risk than had been thought previously to exist. As Senator Barbara Boxer explained, “‘They ordered a new study as a delaying tactic, and it came back and bit them in the arsenic.’” Edward Walsh,
Arsenic Drinking Water Standard Issued; After Seven-Month Scientific Review, EPA Backs ClintonEstablished Levels, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A31.
447. See Ann McFeatters, Bush Accused of Hiding Rule Rollbacks with War, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, June 8, 2003, at A10 (listing examples of the Bush Administration using “sound science” to
justify relaxing regulations). For example, in changing in the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review regulations to give industry greater flexibility to modify their facilities without meeting more stringent standards, EPA cited no evidence that the changes would not adversely affect air quality. See Politics of
Pollution, DENV. POST, Sept. 2, 2003 at B7, at 2003 WL 5510408 (citing General Accounting Office’s
statement that EPA had no scientific data supporting it assertion that the new rules will not make air
pollution worse).
448. Oliver Houck, Editorial, How Industry Hijacked ‘Sound Science’, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 29,
2004, at 7. Consider the delay tactic concerning global warming and the Kyoto Protocol. Rather than
join the Protocol, the Bush Administration has recommended a 10-year study of the issue because the
science is too uncertain. Maureen Lorenzetti, Climate Control, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 11, 2003, 2003 WL
9183441; Global Climate Change Policy Book, Exec. Summ., Feb. 2002 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html. Apparently following the advice of the Luntz memo, the Administration has worked “to make the lack of scientific certainty the
primary issue in the debate.” Luntz Memo, supra note 85, at 137.
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science is, “[w]e will not act until the science is conclusive, i.e., a cold day
in hell.”449
a. Delay: A River Doesn’t Run Through It
Following OMB’s lead, CEQ is flexing its muscles to make the agencies fall in line.450 It ordered the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Army
Corps of Engineers to rethink their plans to release more water down the
Missouri River to save endangered fish and birds.451 Acting under the direction of the CEQ, the Corps “intended to seek to rewrite the Fish and
Wildlife Services’ ‘biological opinion’” that dam operations needed to be
refashioned to save three endangered species.452 Though the National
Academy of Science supported the release, President Bush supported the
status quo during a campaign trip to Missouri. Representative John Thune
urged President Bush to support the release, but as he explained, of course
Bush “wants to honor the commitments he made in Missouri.” To that end,
the White House endorsed a five-year plan to study the impact of increased
water levels.453
Later, according to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS), the Bush Administration formed a new team to review the situation
and make a quick judgment.454 According to UCS, the new fifteen-member
team included two of the scientists from the original team and was lead by
co-leaders with little expertise on the Missouri River. Unlike the original

449. Houck, supra note 448.
450. This phenomenon is not limited to the Department of Interior. For example, CEQ, with a few
changes from OMB, sent back to EPA a report on the state of the environment ordering it to change the
section on climate change. As reported by the New York Times,
An April 29 memorandum circulated among staff members said that after the changes by
White House officials, the section on climate “no longer accurately represents scientific consensus on climate change.” Another memorandum circulated at the same time said that the
easiest course would be to accept the White House revisions but that to do so would taint the
agency, because “E.P.A. will take responsibility and severe criticism from the science and environmental communities for poorly representing the science.”
Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye, Report by the E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al.
451. Michael Grunwald, Bush Delays Action on Missouri River; Agencies Ordered to Consult on
‘Spring Rise’, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at A29.
452. Whitehouse, Army Corps Sound Retreat on Missouri River, U.S. Newswire, June 13, 2002,
2002 WL 22068412.
453. Bill Lambrecht, White House Backs Delay in River Changes: Move is Victory for Officials
Here; Plan Would Have Mimicked Missouri’s Natural Flow, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 14, 2002,
at A1.
454. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE 16 (2004), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/documents/RSI_final_fullreport.pdf.
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report, the new team’s report was not independently peer-reviewed.455
Though UCS is not certain whether the new plan will protect the at-risk
species effectively—
What is clear, however, is that the Bush administration’s political agenda
has interfered with the scientific integrity of the policy making process in
this case. Allyn Sapa, a recently retired biologist with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service who supervised the Missouri River project for more
than five years, commented about the whole affair: “It’s hard not to think
that because our findings don’t match up with what they want to hear,
they are putting a new team on the job who will give them what they
456
want.”

Thus, it would appear that the Bush Administration supports the use of
sound science as long as it does not cause the president to break a campaign promise or cause his corporate donors to expend more resources on
environmental protection.457 As one commentator opined, when President
Bush receives sound science, he says, “hear no science, see no science, delete all science.”458
With respect to the Klamath River Basin, the Department of Interior
disregarded the recommendation of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Marine Fisheries Service that endangered fish in that basin should
receive more water. Instead, Secretary Norton commissioned further study
by the National Academies’ National Research Council (“NRC”).459
Though the Act requires the Secretary to make her decisions based upon
the best available information,460 and the Services made their recommendations based on such, Secretary Norton chose to disregard the statutory
mandate. Here the problem seemed not to be that the Service had used unsound science, but that it did not have enough science.461 As one Fish and
Wildlife Service official explained, the NRC’s report “didn’t say the science proves we were wrong; they just said there wasn’t enough science to

455. Id.
456. Id.
457. See Grunwald, supra note 451 (“[Thune] acknowledged that scientific studies and legal requirements might not be the final arbiter of this battle.”)
458. Derrick Z. Jackson, Bush Doesn’t Hear ‘Sound Science’, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 5, 2003, at B7. After several lawsuits, the controversy over the flows of the Missouri River continues. A new management plan for the river is due to be released in March 2004. Ben House, Missouri
Manual Awaited in March, ARGUS LEADER, Feb. 20, 2004, at 1A.
459. Michael Grunwald, Scientific Report Roils a Salmon War, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at A1.
460. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000).
461. Grunwald, supra note 459 (reporting the interim finding was that there “was ‘no substantial
scientific foundation’” for the Service’s conclusion about the effect of the irrigation project on the endangered fish).
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prove us right.”462 Wendy Wagner persuasively argues that earnest debates
about science are not about the quality of science but rather the quantity of
science required to establish protective regulations.463 She argues that this
“misdirected focus on the quality of science might be an accident, although
it is more likely to be at least partly deliberate. Regulated parties fare better
when the focus is on the quality of scientific research, rather than on the
value choices undergirding protectionist policies.”464
Yet another example of the Bush Administration’s dismissal of science is its proposal to count hatchery salmon along with wild salmon to determine whether the Endangered Species Act should continue to protect
Pacific salmon.465 Six leading salmon experts argue that counting hatchery
salmon “could have devastating consequences” by “confound[ing] risk of
extinction in the wild.”466 Indian tribes are said to favor the move insofar as
the proposal is used to improve hatchery stock,467 without regard to its impact on wild salmon.
These two examples can be characterized as policy erosion at a macrolevel.468 Yet still more problematic is the erosion that likely is occurring at
the micro-level, and unfortunately, this activity largely can go unnoticed by
the public.469 Many of these moves are not headline grabbers but part of iterative day-to-day discretionary decision making. Despite the widespread
public support for protecting endangered species and Congress’ inability to
amend the Act, the Executive Branch very well may be chipping away at

462. Id. The final report from NRC is not yet available to the general public, but it states that there
is no causal link between water levels and the survival of the endangered species. “While the committee
that wrote the report endorsed proposals for a water storage bank and for special seasonal flow
adjustments, it was skeptical of the value of increasing restrictions on the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s
Klamath Project . . . .” Press Release, The National Academies, Broader Approach Needed for
Protection And Recovery of Fish in Klamath River Basin (Oct. 22, 2003) at http://www4.national
academies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309090970?OpenDocument.
463. Wagner, supra note 383, at 109-32.
464. Id. at 112.
465. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Policy on the Consideration of HatcheryOrigin Fish in Endangered Species Act Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 69
Fed. Reg. 31,354 (June 3, 2004). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has already
proposed listings using this proposed policy. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Listing
Determinations for 27 ESUs of West Coast Salmonids, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,102 (June 14, 2004).
466. Ransom A. Myers, et al., Hatcheries and Endangered Salmon, 303 SCI. MAG. 1980 (2004).
467. Charles Pope, Bush Plan Could Change Protections for Salmon, HOUS. CHRON., May 2, 2004,
at 7A.
468. Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Politics By Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 194-97 (2001) (describing
erosion of EPA’s policymaking at a macro-level in implementing the Food Quality Protection Act).
469. Cf. id. at 198 (describing policy erosion “[b]ecause micro-policymaking at the staff level is
largely hidden from public view” for implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act).
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that protection. Thomas McGarity explains the process of how agencies can
subvert statutory policies,
as the program office within the implementing agency engages in considerably less visible day-to-day resolution of science/policy questions
on a case-by-case basis. In both cases, strongly articulated statutory policies can erode away under constant pressures from interests groups that
opposed those policies during the legislative debates and continue to op470
pose them during the implementation stage.

Moreover, this focus on the procedural aspects of scientific review excludes all but the most resourceful, “attentive regulatory participants,”
namely “regulated industries or their advocates.”471 The poster-children for
many of these reforms—small landowners—realistically cannot be expected to engage in this type of analysis and advocacy.472 Instead, wellfinanced developers are the ones likely to take advantage of the guidance’s
procedures, such as challenging information disseminated by the Service.473
And challenges by industry may be numerous because the costs of such
challenges are minimal, whereas “the benefits of abusing these provisions
can be considerable to private parties; at best they can lead to the exclusion
or discrediting of pivotal studies that undergird protective regulation, and at
worst, they can divert the agency’s resources and priorities away from developing protection policies.”474
b. Deregulation: The “No Surprises” Rule
One of the criticisms of the Act is that is does not provide landowners
adequate notice of prohibitions or adequate assurance that development can
proceed without fear of prosecution. In partial response to this concern, the
Service implemented a “no surprises” policy475 as part of the incidental take
permitting process under section 10 of the Act. This policy “quietly” assured landowners that if they took conservation measures pursuant to a
habitat conservation plan, they would not be subjected later to demands for
additional commitments of land or money, even if the needs of the pro-

470. Id. at 194 (2001) (citation omitted).
471. Wagner, supra note 383, 103-04 (2003).
472. Cf. id. at 63, 103-04 (suggesting that resources and expertise are necessary to participate meaningfully under such reforms).
473. The Fish and Wildlife Service has received only two challenges under the Information Quality
Act. The national public interest group, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility initiated
one challenge and Fjord Seafood initiated the other one. OMB Watch, Data Quality Challenges, at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1419#fws (last visited May 11, 2004).
474. Wagner, supra note 383, at 105.
475. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb.
23, 1998).
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tected species changed over time.476 The Service stated that Congress “envisioned and allowed the Federal government to provide assurances . . .
through the § 10 incidental take permit process [and a] driving concern during the development of this policy was the absence of adequate incentives
for non-Federal landowners to factor endangered species conservation into
their day-to-day land management activities.”477 Concerns abounded, however, about whether the administration could make regulatory changes to
accomplish that which Congress had been unable to do.478 Despite the
many questions regarding the soundness of this policy,479 the Service formalized it as a regulation in 1998.480
The chief practical concern among conservationists was that the rule
would not allow the Service to require additional conservation or mitigation measures if in the future the need arose to take more protective measures to ensure that development activities would “not appreciably reduce

476. George T. Frampton, Jr., ‘Quiet Success’ of Endangered Species Act, ROLL CALL, Apr. 3,
1995 (Frampton was the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, Department of Interior.).
477. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb.
23, 1998). But see Houck, supra note 394, at 285 (arguing that Congress intended this provision to give
limited flexibility).
478. Cf. Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998) (arguing
that EPA exceeded it legal authority). Another example of an environmental agency recently exceeding
its statutory authority is EPA with respect to the Clean Air Act and the regulations for New Source Review. In October 2003 it changed the types of modifications to stationary sources of pollution such as
power and industrial plants that would be subject to certain regulations. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of
the Routine Maintenance Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248-01 (Oct. 27, 2003)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). There had been many legislative initiatives to amend the Clean
Air Act in this fashion, but none were successful. However, Vice President Dick Cheney’s energy task
force made a recommendation to EPA after studying industry complaints about enforcement actions and
out of that recommendation sprang this revised rule. Katherine Q. Seelye & Jennifer 8. Lee, Court
Blocks U.S. Effort to Relax Pollution Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, 25, 2003, at A1. See Reliable, Affordable,
and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future: Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (May 6, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. A
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia questioned whether
the Administration had the authority to make this change and stayed the rule pending litigation. New
York v. EPA, No. 03-1380, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 26520, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 2003); see also
Seelye & Lee, supra note 478, at A1.
479. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8861-68
(Feb. 23, 1998) (summarizing comments on the proposed rule).
480. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2004). The rule was finalized initially as a part of the Endangered Species
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook in 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854-02 (Dec. 2, 1996). A non-profit
organization sued the Service and as part of the settlement, the Service agreed to subject the rule to further public comment and ultimately reissued the rule in 1998. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances
(“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998).
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the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”481 In
fact, a group of scientists meeting at Stanford University objected to the
rule “because it runs counter to the natural world, which is full of surprises.”482 Nature and scientific research both will produce “surprises;” timing is the only question.483 The “No Surprises” Rule does not allow the
Service to require amendments to habitat conservation plans when “surprises” occur, however, except under limited conditions.
In providing this assurance to private landowners, the rule draws a distinction between “changed circumstances” and “unforeseen circumstances,” and the rule is problematic in either case. “Changed circumstances” reasonably can be anticipated and planned for,484 whereas
“unforeseen circumstances” cannot reasonably be anticipated and result in
substantial, adverse change to the condition of the listed species.485 If additional conservation or mitigation measures not provided for in the plan are
necessary to address changed circumstances, the Service will not require
additional measures.486 If additional conservation or mitigation measures
are necessary to address unforeseen circumstances, the Service may require
additional conservation or mitigation measures, but it “will not involve the
commitment of additional land, water or financial compensation or additional restriction on the use of land, water, or other natural resources otherwise available for development or use under the original terms of the
conservation plan or without the consent of the permittee.”487
The Spirit of Sage Council, a coalition of Native Americans, community groups, and citizens, recently renewed their challenge of the No Surprises Rule on a several grounds, including that the rule violates sections 2,
3(3), 7(a)(1), and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act. The rule, the
Council argued, prevents the Service from making changes to incidental
take permits that may be necessary for the continued survival of listed species and it allows the Service to issue permits under conditions not author-

481. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv)(2004) (one of the conditions for issuing an incidental take permit).
482. A Statement on Proposed Private Lands Initiatives and Reauthorization of the Endangered
Species Act from the Meeting of Scientists at Stanford University (March 31, 1997), at
http://www.defenders.org/esa-6.html.
483. Id.
484. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004).
485. Id.
486. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(ii) (2004) (endangered species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5)(ii) (2004)
(threatened species).
487. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(iii)(B) (2004) (endangered species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5)(iii)(B)
(2004) (threatened species).
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ized by the Act.488 In December 2003, the District Court for the District of
Columbia remanded the rule for reconsideration by the Service489 and in
June 2004, the court prohibited the issuance of new incidental take permits
with “‘No Surprise’ assurances” pending adoption of new revocation
rules.490 The No Surprises Rule was an attempt to diffuse a volatile situation, but it failed to give due consideration to some of the principles and
values undergirding species protection.
VIII. A QUESTION OF VALUES AND NEW ENTITLEMENTS
The initiatives proposed to address the problems that political rhetoric
describes often involve the use of certain types of analysis, such as taking
impact analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and sound science. Much of the reliance upon these seemingly objective analyses, however, is likely subterfuge for a discussion of values.491 The political rhetoric blurs the issues in
this important debate and precludes meaningful discussion. Amid this
noise, some would argue that we need “to restore a sense of moral urgency
to the protection of life, health, and the environment.”492
The rhetoric assumes that certain values hinge upon unfettered private
property rights and that these initiatives promote those values. These values
include wealth, autonomy, and freedom.493 Privileging these values over
others results in policies that do not adequately take into account other values that the public has expressed as important. These include anthropocentric and biocentric values such as human health, ecology, aesthetics, and
cultural heritage.
And the rhetoric excludes certain segments of the public from the
conversation. The National Academies formed the Public Participation in
Environmental Assessment and Decision Making panel to study ways in
which federal agencies can improve public participation in environmental

488. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C. 2003).
489. Id. The court did not reach the merits of the No Surprises Rule but found that it was sufficiently intertwined with the Permit Revocation Rule, Safe Harbor Agreements, and Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706, 32,712-14 (June 17, 1999), which it had vacated, to justify remand. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 85, 91-92.
490. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, No. 98-1873, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10789, at *4 (D.D.C.
June 10, 2004).
491. Pete Bodo, What Rules Are Needed to Keep the Wilderness Wild?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004,
at 10 (“This really is about a clash of values . . . . You have people who cherish solitude, exercise and
backcountry traditions versus people who have grown accustomed to complete freedom of motorized
access.” (quoting Rollen Sparrowe, Pres. Wildlife Management Institute)).
492. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 369, at 11.
493. Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 68
(2003).
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assessment and decision-making. As an EPA scientist explained, agencies
“are concerned that they hear from only certain segments of the public and
that ‘huge gaps’ remain in the perspectives provided . . . . Different segments of the public have divergent information and values that are important for federal agencies to understand.”494 One of the panel members remarked that too often Congress thinks that risk and cost-benefit analysis
can solve complex environmental problems, but public participation and
appreciation of divergent values are also needed.495
Victor Flatt argues that we cannot successfully implement environmental laws without consideration of certain “squishy” values that have not
been traditionally quantifiable by cost-benefit analysis.496 Yet “[b]oth sides
of the regulatory debate often engage in a conspiratorial silence about these
values.”497 Flatt suggests that even if the participants in the debate are
aware of these values they do not discuss them because they are afraid. On
one side they are afraid that they will be considered irrational, and on the
other they fear that acknowledgement of these values will give the values
legitimacy.498 Flatt acknowledges that including these squishy values
makes the decision-making process susceptible to a certain amount of subjectivity. Being aware of and recognizing the limitations arising from this
subjectivity would force decision makers to make the difficult choices by
openly including these values rather than disingenuously asserting that the
agency can simply apply a technical formula and derive the solution.499
In this debate, these unspoken or blurry values heavily influence the
implementation of the ESA and proposals for reform. The outcomes are
consistent with the values hidden in the political rhetoric but not necessarily with those that the public has expressed for species protection. For example, despite the Contract with America having as one of its aims the

494. Academies to Review Ways to Boost Public Involvement in Decisionmaking, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA), No. 153, at A-19 (Aug. 8, 2003) (remarks of Michael Slimak, an ecological scientist in EPA’s Office and Research and Development).
495. Id.
496. Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back Into the Fold
With A New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
497. Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA Implementation by
Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as Environmental Values under
NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 102 (1994).
498. Id.
499. Flatt, supra note 496, at 3. This phenomenon is also known as the “science charade”, wherein
agencies exaggerate the contributions of science in developing regulations in order to shirk accountability for their underlying policy decisions. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
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elimination of many entitlements,500 the proposed Endangered Species
Land Management Reform Act would have created a new entitlement. Under the common law “public ownership doctrine,” the government owns all
wildlife for the benefit of the public and has the right to protect that wildlife on private property. No property owner may claim a right to harm wildlife absent authorization from the public.501 Courts consistently have sanctioned the government’s ability to regulate, without compensation, private
land use for the benefit of wildlife under this doctrine.502 Thus, by providing compensation under the Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act, Congress would have created a new right.
Moreover, if the government holds threatened and endangered species
in trust for its citizenry, should not a developer who wishes to take such resources be required to compensate the citizenry for what Professor Richard
Epstein deems the converse eminent domain? Professor Epstein asks first
whether the government should transfer public property to private entities
and then if it does make such a transfer, what compensation is due.
The problem of disposing of public property thus raises the mirror image
of public use and just compensation questions under the Fifth Amendment: “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” The underlying problems are not any simpler when dealing with property which was originally held by the public in common,
for now the guiding principle is in a sense the converse of the original
eminent domain clause, to wit: “No public property may be transferred to
503
private use, without just compensation,” payable to the public at large.

The common law and the Endangered Species Act place an obligation upon
the government to protect these public trust assets. In the event that the
government decides to alienate them, it must receive compensation for such
transactions.504
And although every reform-minded member of Congress seemingly
had a horror story to tell about a small landowner in his district, the Endan500. E.g., Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) (2000) (removing drug addiction or alcoholism as a basis for awarding disability benefits under the Old Age Survivor and Disability Insurance program); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000) (changing, inter alia, direct payments to individuals under Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to block grants to states to use at their discretion).
501. John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 331, 333 (2003).
502. Id. at 346-50. See also Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What
Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?,
80 IOWA L. REV. 297, 308-321 (1995) (outlining country’s tradition of protecting wildlife without compensating landowners beginning with the English common law roots and continuing into the present).
503. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 419 (1987).
504. Cf. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 515 (2002) (proposing a “skytrust” to capture the value of the public’s interest in the atmosphere).
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gered Species Land Management Reform Act primarily would have benefited large landowners (and lawyers). A relatively small number of private
entities own the majority of private land. “Approximately 125,000 timber
or farm owners, less than two-tenths of one percent of all private landowners, own 38% of all the private land in the United States. Timber and farm
interests that amount to less than 3% of all landowners, own more than
80% of all private land.”505 Representative John Conyers of Michigan criticized a similar bill, arguing that “[t]he result of such a measure passing
would be . . . hard-working American taxpayers . . . forced to watch as their
hard-earned wages are collected by the Government, as taxes are paid out
to corporations . . . and large landowners as takings compensation.”506
Though Congress was unsuccessful in passing such “takings” legislation, the Bush Administration has been able to compensate those landowners through incentive programs designed to encourage conservation. The
beneficiaries of these new subsidies may tend to be the wealthy, at the expense of the average taxpayer.507 Such compensation schemes create a
“two-tiered system of laws” with one group of people simply complying
with the ESA, while another group would be paid by the government to
comply.508 American jurist James Kent espoused private property rights to
the extent that they are “consistent with good order, and the reciprocal
rights of others.”509 Such a compensation scheme is inconsistent with both
of these goals.
IX. CONCLUSION
The political rhetoric surrounding the Endangered Species Act is seductive. It lures its audience into a world where costs eclipse benefits, conjecture prevails over sound science, and species protection abrogates private property rights. It is a world that is out of balance and needs to be
righted by some common sense initiatives. Though the Contract with

505. Hearing on Endangered Species Act Before the Senate Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and
Water of the Senate Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John
D. Echeverria, Director, Environmental Policy Project, Georgetown University Law School), 2001 WL
2007868.
506. 141 CONG. REC. H2459, H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
507. See Hearing on Endangered Species Act Before the Senate Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife
and Water of the Senate Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
John D. Echeverria, Director, Environmental Policy Project, Georgetown University Law School), 2001
WL 2007868 (criticizing proposal for extensive use of tax-payer funded incentive programs to complement or replace enforcement of the ESA).
508. See Tanya L. Godfrey, Note, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: A Hotly
Contested Debate, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 979, 1018-20 (1996) (discussing compensation statutes).
509. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265 (1st ed. 1827).
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America failed in “reforming” the Act, it advanced this ideological ball
considerably and the Executive Branch has picked up that ball and is running with it.
Though purporting to protect private property rights and promote a
smarter regulatory process, these actions advance a set of values that are in
conflict with those that undergird the ESA. The legal regime they engender
creates new entitlements, otherwise known as “incentives,” for private
property owners who never held the right to harm wildlife without express
permission from the sovereign as the public’s representative.
This Article demonstrates that left unchecked, this rhetoric influences
outcomes both formally and informally, whether through appropriations
riders, regulations, or day-to-day discretionary agency actions. Moreover,
its influence over the day-to-day activities of the agency is even more pernicious because policy erosion at this level, by its very nature, is difficult to
document and challenge. Yet there is compelling evidence that the rhetoric
is eroding the efficacy of the Endangered Species Act to the detriment of
the imperiled species and the public. Indeed, rhetoric still matters.

